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affected by management fees than the decisions by conventional fund investors. 
 
Keywords:  socially  responsible  investments,  ethical  investing,  corporate  social  responsibility, 
mutual funds, performance evaluation, money-flows, investment screens, mutual funds. 
 
JEL codes: A13, G11 and G12 
 
a. Department of Finance and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands, and 
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), email: Luc.Renneboog@uvt.nl. 
b. Department of Finance and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands, 
email: j.r.terhorst@uvt.nl.  
c. Corresponding author; Management School, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK, email: c.zhang@shef.ac.uk.  1
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, socially responsible investments (SRI), often also called ethical investments 
or  sustainable  investments,  have  grown  rapidly  around  the  world  and  become  a  multi-trillion  dollar 
market. SRI can be defined broadly as “an investment process that considers the social and environmental 
consequences  of  investments,  both  positive  and  negative,  within  the  context  of  rigorous  financial 
analysis” (Social Investment Forum (SIF), 2001:4). Unlike conventional types of investments, SRI funds 
apply  a  set  of  investment  screens  to  select  stocks  from  an  investment  universe  based  on  social, 
environmental or ethical (SEE) criteria. 
This paper surveys the literature on socially responsible investments. In the first part of the paper, 
we review the institutional background of ethical investing. In particular, we study the historical roots, the 
market development, the regulatory background, and the investment screens employed in SRI. While 
ethical investing has ancient origins and is rooted in religious traditions, modern SRI is based on growing 
social  awareness.  Issues  like  environment  protection,  human  rights  and  corporate  governance  have 
become common in the investment screens used by SRI. Currently, socially screened assets represent 
about 10% of the total assets under management in the US. Furthermore, in recent years, governments in 
western countries have taken many regulatory initiatives regarding SRI. For instance, the UK was the first 
country that regulated the disclosure of social, environmental or ethical investment policies by pension 
funds and charities.  
Second, we introduce the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR). At the heart of SRI is a 
fundamental question: is a firm’s aim to maximize shareholder value or stakeholder value? While in 
competitive  and  complete  markets  there  is  no  conflict  between these  two  objectives,  in  practice  the 
maximization of shareholder value often conflicts with the stakeholder value criterion due to the existence 
of economic externalities. In the paper, we define corporate social responsibility as a combination of good 
corporate governance, sound environmental standards, and care of stakeholder relations. We will present 
the empirical findings on the impact of each of these three components on shareholder value. In general, 
the literature shows that CSR enhances shareholder value. 
Third, we review the literature on performance evaluation of mutual funds. We evaluate mutual 
fund  performance  from  the  perspective  of  a  mean-variance  investor,  and  discuss  the  performance 
evaluation techniques based on the CAPM and multifactor models (e.g. Carhart (1997)). We also discuss 
methodologies  using  conditional  strategies  (e.g.  Ferson  and  Schadt  (1996))  and  seemingly  unrelated 
assets (e.g. Pastor and Stambaugh (2002)) to evaluate fund performance. Furthermore, tests of market-
timing ability and return-based style analysis are discussed. 
Fourth,  we  present  the  empirical  findings  on  the  performance  and  money-flows  of  socially 
responsible mutual funds around the world. For SRI funds in the US and UK, there is little evidence that 
the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds are different from those of conventional funds (see, e.g., Bauer,   2
Koedijk and Otten (2005)). However, SRI funds in Continental Europe and Asia-Pacific show strong 
underperformance  relative  to  benchmark  portfolios.  Furthermore,  while  SRI  investors  chase  past 
performance, their decision to invest in an SRI fund is less affected by management fees and funds’ risk 
than the decision of conventional fund investors (Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2006)). Also, the 
volatility of money-flows is lower in SRI funds than in conventional funds (Bollen (2006)). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional background 
of SRI.  Section 3 reviews the theoretical literature on and the empirical firm-level analyses of corporate 
social responsibility. Section 4 reviews the econometric techniques employed in portfolio performance 
evaluation,  and Section  5  introduces the  empirical findings  of  the literature on  the  performance  and 
money-flows of SRI mutual funds. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Institutional Background of SRI 
 
2.1  History of SRI 
 
Ethical investing has ancient origins and is rooted in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions. 
Judaism has a wealth of teachings on how to use money ethically
1, and in medieval Christian times, there 
were ethical restrictions on loans and investments which were based on the Old Testament
2. The Catholic 
Church imposed a universal prohibition on usury in 1139, which had not been relaxed until the 19
th 
century. In England, a law called The Act Against Usury which prohibited excessive interests on loans 
was in effect from 1571 to 1624 (Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998), and Lewison (1999))
3. In the 17
th 
century, the Quakers (‘Society of Friends’) refused to profit from the weapons and slaves trade when they 
settled in North America. The founder of Methodism, John Wesley (1703-1791), stated in his sermon 
‘The Use of Money’ that people should not engage in sinful trade or profit from exploiting others. The 
Methodist Church in the UK avoided investing in ‘sinful’ companies, such as companies involved in 
alcohol, tobacco, weapons and gambling, when they began investing in the stock market in 1920s. Based 
on the teachings of the Koran and its interpretations, Islamic investors avoid investing in companies 
involved in pork production, pornography, gambling, and in interest-based financial institutions.  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Gifts to the Poor 10:7: "There are eight degrees of tzedakah 
(righteous giving), one above the other. The highest degree is to strengthen the hand of a poor person by making a 
gift or a loan, or entering into a partnership, or finding work for him/her, so that they become self-sufficient". In 
Torah, Leviticus 19:9-10 "When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap all the way to the edges of the 
field,  or  gather  the  gleanings  of  your  harvest…  You  shall  leave  them  for  the  poor  and  the  stranger."  and 
Deuteronomy 15:7-8 "If there be among you a needy person…you shall not shut your hand from him/her; but you 
shall surely open your hand and shall surely lend sufficient for his/her need, as to that which is lacking". 
2 See, e.g., Exodus 22:25 “If you lend money to my people, to the poor among you, you are not to act as a creditor to 
him; you shall not charge him interest” and Deuteronomy 23:19 "You shall not charge interest to your countrymen: 
interest on money, food, or anything that may be loaned at interest; but you may charge interest from loans to 
foreigners". 
3 During the reign of Henry VIII (1491-1547), usury was defined as a loan with interest rate higher than 10%.     3
Modern SRI is based on growing social awareness of investors. Since the 1960s, a series of social 
campaigns, e.g. the anti-war and the anti-racist movements, have made investors concerned about the 
social consequences of their investments. The first modern SRI mutual fund
4, the Pax World Fund, was 
founded in 1971 in the US. Created for investors opposed to the Vietnam War (and militarism in general), 
the fund avoided investments in weapons contractors. In the 1980s, the racist system of apartheid in South 
Africa became a focal point of protests by social investors. SRI investors in the US pressurized companies 
doing business in South Africa to divert those operations to other countries, and urged mutual funds not to 
include  South-African  nor  western  firms  with  South-African  subsidiaries  into  their  portfolios.  These 
campaigns  were  relatively  successful,  for  instance,  the  state  legislature  of  California  passed  a  law 
amendment in 1986 requiring the state’s pension funds to divest over $6 billion from companies with 
activities in South Africa (Sparkes, 2002: 54).  
On April 25
th, 1986 the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the former Soviet Union (now Ukraine) 
exploded during a test, spreading radioactive material across Europe and increasing the number of cancer 
deaths by over 2500. On March 23
th, 1989 the worst environmental disaster in the US occurred when the 
oil supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground near Alaska and spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil. The 
above  and  other  environmental  disasters  in  the  late  1980s  made  investors  aware  of  the  negative 
environmental consequences of industrial development.  
Since the early 1990s, the SRI industry has experienced strong growth in the US, Europe, and the 
rest of the world. An important factor behind this growth was ethical consumerism, where consumers pay 
a premium for products that are consistent with their personal values. Issues like environment protection, 
human rights, and labor relations have become common in the SRI investment screens. In recent years, a 
series of corporate scandals has turned corporate governance and responsibility into another focal point of 
SRI investors. Hence, criteria like transparency, governance and sustainability have emerged as essential 
SRI screens. 
 
2.2 The Market of SRI  
 
Over the past decade, socially responsible investments have experienced a phenomenal growth 
around the world. Table 1 presents the total assets under management (AUM) of SRI screened portfolios 
and mutual funds in the US, Europe, Canada and Australia. 
In the US, the professionally managed assets of socially screened portfolios reached $2.3 trillion in 
2003, growing by 1200% from $162 billion in 1995. Currently, SRI assets represent about 10% of total 
assets under management in the US (SIF, 2005). Although the European SRI market is still in an early 
stage of development, it is also growing rapidly. In 2003, the assets of SRI screened portfolios in Europe 
totaled around ￿230 billion, and they account for about 1% of total assets under professional management 
                                                 
4 The first socially screened mutual fund, the Pioneer Fund, was founded in 1928. This fund excluded investments in 
the alcohol and tobacco industries.   4
in Europe. The UK, the Netherlands and Belgium are the countries with the highest percentage of socially 
screened assets in Europe. In the US, the assets under management of SRI funds
5 reached $138 billion in 
2003. From 1995 to 2003, the number of SRI mutual funds grew from 55 to 178 in the US (SIF, 2003), 
from 54 to 313 in Europe (SiRi, 2003), and from 10 to 63 in Australia (EIA, 2003).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
It is sometimes argued that investors in ethical funds are willing to sacrifice financial returns in 
order to comply with their social or environmental objectives. The fact that SRI investors may have a 
different investment objective function is suggested by the SIF (2001) report: during the stock market 
downturn over the first 9 months of 2001, there was a 94% drop in the money inflows into all US mutual 
funds. In contrast, the fall in net investments in socially screened mutual funds amounted to merely 54%. 
The  SIF (2003,  p.8) states,  “Typically,  social investors’  assets  are  “stickier” than  those  of  investors 
concerned  only  with  financial  performance.  That  is,  social  investors  have  been  less  likely  to  move 
investments  from  one  fund  to  another  and  have  been  more  inclined  to  stay  with  their  funds  than 
conventional investors.”  
In the foreseeable future, the growth of SRI assets is expected to continue worldwide. Some of the 
largest pension funds in the world have shown increasing interest in participating in SRI. The California 
Public  Employees’  Retirement  System  (CALPERS),  the  largest  pension  fund  in  the  world,  actively 
engages companies to promote socially responsible behavior and was one of the leaders of the tobacco 
divestment of the late 1990s. The Dutch Pension Fund for Public Employees (ABP), the largest pension 
fund in Europe, revised its Code for Prudent Investment Policy in 2000, which states that ABP will 
promote the integration of SEE criteria in its investment process. Mr. Jean Frijns, the Chief Investment 
Officer of ABP Investments, regards sustainable investment as “one of the most critical factors driving 
the future of fiduciary investment” (Financial Times, Jan. 26, 2003). In addition, the Dutch pension fund 
PGGM, which manages about ￿45 billion assets, applies two negative screens (weapons production and 
human rights violation) to its investment portfolios (Eurosif, 2003).  
 
2.3 Regulatory Background 
 
The growth of the SRI industry can be partly attributed to the changes in regulation regarding the 
disclosure of social, environmental and ethical (SEE) information by pension funds and listed companies. 
In this section, we review the regulatory initiatives taken by national governments regarding SRI and 
summarize these in Table 2. Most of the SRI regulation is passed in Europe. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                 
5 SRI funds or socially responsible investment mutual funds, a subset of socially screened portfolios, refer to the 
mutual funds applying SRI screens in their investment process.   5
a. UK 
The UK was the first country that regulated the disclosure of SEE investment policies of pension 
funds and charities. This has contributed considerably to the growth of SRI industry. In July 2000, the 
Amendment to the 1995 Pensions Act was approved, requiring trustees of occupational pension funds to 
disclose in the Statement of Investment Principles “the extent (if at all) to which social, environmental 
and  ethical  considerations  are  taken  into  account  in  the  selection,  retention  and  realization  of 
investments”.  
The Trustee Act 2000, which came into effect in February 2001, requires charity trustees to ensure 
that investments are suitable to a charity’s stated aims. According to the Charity Commission guidance, 
charities  should  include  ‘any  relevant  ethical  considerations  as  to  the  kind  of  investments  that  are 
appropriate for the trust to make’. In 2002, The Cabinet Office in the UK published the Review of Charity 
Law in 2002, which proposed that all charities with an annual income of over ￿ 1 million report on the 
extent to which SEE issues are taken into account in their investment policies. The Home Office accepted 
theses recommendations in 2003.  
In  addition,  large  organizations  of  institutional  investors  also  have  taken  SRI  initiatives.  For 
instance, the Association of British Insurers (ABI), whose members invest in about $1 trillion assets, 
published a disclosure guideline in 2001 suggesting that listed companies report on material SEE risks 
relevant to their business activities. 
 
b. Continental Europe 
Over  the  past  decade,  some  national  governments  in  continental  Europe  passed  a  series  of 
regulations  regarding  social  and  environmental  investments  and  savings.  Since  1991,  the  Renewable 
Energy Act in Germany gives a tax advantage for closed-end funds to invest in wind energy (Eurosif, 
2003). In 1995, the Dutch Tax Office introduced “Green Savings and Investment Plan”, which grants a 
tax deduction to investments in specific ‘green’ projects, such as wind and solar energy, and organic 
farming. 
Following the British Amendment to the 1995 Pensions Act of 2000, four countries in Continental 
Europe (namely Belgium, Germany, Italy and Sweden) have passed similar regulations requiring pension 
funds to disclose SEE related information. In 2001, Belgium passed the ‘Vandebroucke’ law, which 
requires pension funds to report the degree to which their investments take into account social, ethical and 
environmental aspects. In January 2002, Germany adopted a regulation requiring that certified private 
pension schemes and occupational pension schemes “must inform the members in writing, whether and in 
what form ethical, social, or ecological aspects are taken into consideration when investing the paid-in 
contributions”  (Eurosif,  2003).  Sweden  passed  a  regulation  (effective  since  January  2002),  requiring 
Swedish  national  pension funds  to  incorporate  environmental  and ethical  aspects in  their  investment 
policies. In Italy, a legislation was adopted in September 2004 requiring pension funds to disclose the 
effect of non-financial factors (including social, environmental and ethical factors) that influence their   6
investment decisions. All these initiatives, have clearly had a positive impact on the growth of the SRI 
fund industry in Europe. 
France is the first and so-far the only European country making SEE reporting mandatory for all 
listed companies. In May  2001, the legislation “New Economic Regulations” came into force: listed 
companies are to publish social and environmental information on the companies in their annual reports
6. 
Meanwhile,  since  February  2001,  the  managers of Employee  Savings  Plans are  required  to  consider 
social, environmental or ethical issues when buying and selling shares
7.  
 
c. Outside Europe 
In the US, section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (July 2002), requires companies to disclose a 
written code of ethics signed by their chief executive, chief financial officer and chief accountant. 
Australia is the only country outside Europe that has adopted a regulation regarding SRI. In 2001, 
the Australian government passed a bill requiring that all investment firms’ product disclosure statements 
include  descriptions  of  “the  extent  to  which  labor  standards  or  environmental,  social  or  ethical 
considerations are taken into account.” Since 2001, all listed companies on the Australian Stock Exchange 
are obliged to make an annual social responsibility report. 
 
2.4 Investment Screens 
 
The investment screens used in SRI have evolved over time. Table 3 presents a summary of the SRI 
screens used by ethical funds around the world. Usually, SRI mutual funds apply a combination of the 
social screens. SIF (2003) reports that 64% of all socially screened mutual funds in the US use more than 
five screens, while 18% of SRI funds use only one screen. These screens can be broadly classified into 
two groups: negative screens and positive ones.  
First, the oldest and most basic SRI strategies are based on negative screens. These filters refer to 
the practice that certain stocks or industries are excluded from SRI portfolios based on SEE criteria. The 
funds based on such screens account for $2.0 trillion out of the $2.15 trillion SRI assets in the US (SIF, 
2003). A typical negative screen can be applied on an initial asset pool such as the S&P 500 stocks from 
which the alcohol, tobacco, gambling and defense industries, or companies with poor performance in 
labor relations and environment protection are excluded. After negative SRI screening, the portfolios are 
created through financial and quantitative selection. The most common negative screens exclude tobacco, 
                                                 
6 Law No. 2001-420, Art. 225-102-1: “[The annual report] also contains information, the detail of which is being 
determined by a decree of the Council of State, on how the company takes into account the social and environmental 
consequences of its activities. The present paragraph applies only to ( listed ) companies [...]." (www.eurosif.org) 
7 Law No. 2001-152, Art. 214-39: "The [fund's] internal rules specify, if need be, the social, environmental or 
ethical considerations the fund management company must take into account when buying or selling securities, as 
well as when exercising the voting rights attached to the ownership of these securities. The fund's annual report 
reports  on  how  these  considerations  have  been  taken  into  account,  in  terms  defined  by  the  Commission  des 
Opérations de Bourse. "   7
alcohol, gambling, weapons and nuclear power. Other negative screens may include irresponsible foreign 
operations, pornography, abortion, workplace conditions, violation of human rights, and animal testing. 
Some SRI funds only exclude companies from the investment universe when their revenue derived from 
‘a-social or un-ethical’ sectors exceed a specific threshold, while other SRI funds apply the negative 
screens to the company’s branches or suppliers. A small number of SRI funds use screens based on 
traditional ideological of religious convictions: for instance they exclude investments in firms producing 
pork  products,  in  financial  institutions  paying  interest  on  savings,  and  even  in  insurance  companies 
insuring non-married people
8.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Second, SRI portfolios are nowadays mostly based on positive screens, which in practice boils 
down to selecting shares that meet superior SEE standards. The most common positive screens focus on 
corporate governance, labor relations, the environment, sustainability of investments, and the stimulation 
of cultural diversity. Positive screens are also frequently used to select companies with a good track 
records concerning renewable energy usage or community involvement. The use of positive screens is 
often combined with a ‘best in class’ approach. Firms are ranked within each industry or market sector 
based  on  SEE  criteria.  Subsequently,  for  each  industry  only  those  firms  are  selected  which  pass  a 
minimum threshold.  
Negative and positive screens are often referred to as the first and second generation of SRI screens 
respectively. The third generation of screens refers to an integrated approach of selecting companies 
based  on  the  economic,  environmental  and  social  criteria  comprised  by  both  negative  and  positive 
screens. This approach is often called “sustainability” or "triple bottom line" (due to its focus on ‘People, 
Planet and Profit’). The fourth generation of ethical funds combines the sustainable investing approach 
(third generation) with shareholder activism and commitment. In this case, portfolio managers or the 
companies specialized in granting ethical labels attempt to influence the company’s actions through direct 
dialogue with the management or by the use of voting rights at Annual General Meetings. SIF (2003) 
reports that in 2002 socially responsible investors in the US filed 292 shareholder resolutions on SEE 
issues. The largest number of resolutions is on environmental issues, followed by issues on global labor 
standards and equal employment conditions.  
 
3  Firm-level Analysis on SRI 
 
In  this  section,  we  introduce  the  findings  of  firm-level  studies  related  to  socially  responsible 
investments. While Section 3.1 surveys the theoretical arguments, Section 3.2 focuses on the empirical 
evidence. 
                                                 
8 These SRI funds are usually small which in total manage less than $100 million of assets in the US.   8
 
3.1 Theoretical Background: Should Companies Be Socially Responsible? 
 
Finance textbooks state that companies should maximize the value of their shareholders’ equity
9. In 
other  words,  companies’  only  responsibility  is  a  financial  one.  In  recent  years,  corporate  social 
responsibility  (CSR)  has  become  a  focal  point  of  policy  makers  (and  investors),  who  demand  that 
corporations assume some responsibility towards society, the environment, or the stakeholders in general. 
SRI investors thus aim at promoting socially and environmentally sound corporate behavior. They avoid 
companies producing goods that may cause health hazards or exploiting employees both in developed and 
developing countries (negative screening) and select companies with sound social and environmental 
records  and  with  good  corporate  governance  (positive  screening).  In  general,  SRI  investors  expect 
companies to focus on social welfare in addition to value maximization.  
 
a. Shareholder value vs. Stakeholder value 
At  the  heart  of  the  SRI  movement  is  a  fundamental  question:  is  a  firm’s  aim  to  maximize 
shareholder  value  or  social  value  (defined  as  the  sum  of  the  value  generated  for  all  stakeholders)? 
Classical economics (e.g. Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ and the social welfare theorems) states that there 
is no conflict between the two goals: in competitive and complete markets, when all firms maximize their 
own profits (value), the resource allocation is Pareto-optimal and the social welfare is maximized.  
However, modern economic theory also tells us that in some circumstances, namely when some of 
the assumptions of the welfare theorems do not hold, profit-maximizing behavior does not necessarily 
imply social-welfare maximizing outcomes. One of such circumstances is the existence of externalities, 
arising when the costs and benefits of an agent’s action are affected by the actions of other (external) 
agents.  Jensen  (2001)  gives  a  simple  example  of  externalities:  a  fishery’s  catch  is  impaired  by  the 
pollution of an upstream chemical plant. When the chemical plant maximizes its profit by increasing 
pollution (as the cost of pollution are not borne by the chemical plant), the fishery in the downstream 
suffers from catching less fish and the social welfare (in this simplified case, equal to the sum of the 
profits of the two stakeholders) is not maximized. Economic solutions to the externality problem include 
the  imposition  of  regulation  (e.g.  quotas  or  taxes  on  pollution)  and  the  creation  of  a  market  for 
externalities (e.g. the trading of pollution permits). In practice, the maximization of shareholder value 
often conflicts with the social welfare criterion represented by the interests of all stakeholders of a firm, 
including employees, customers, local communities, environment and so forth. In Continental European 
                                                 
9 Value is the present value of future profits over the long run, and it is not necessarily the current market value of 
the firm, as markets can be irrational. Jensen (2004) argues that overvalued equity creates additional agency costs, 
which will inevitably lead to the destruction of firm value over the long run. Therefore, managers should regularly 
communicate with capital markets to prevent not only undervaluation but also overvaluation.   9
corporate  governance  regimes,  a  stakeholder  approach  is  more  common  than  in  the  Anglo-Saxon 
countries.
10   
 
b. The problems of the stakeholder theory and implications for SRI 
According to the shareholder value theory, managers are expected to invest until the marginal 
project’s return exceeds the cost of capital. In the stakeholder value concept, managers are asked to 
balance the interests of all stakeholders such that the aggregate welfare is maximized. But the stakeholder 
concept does not define how to aggregate welfare and how to make the tradeoff between stakeholders. If 
the social value of firms can be maximized, the society will by definition benefit. However, the question 
is whether or not this goal is achievable and how economic efficiency and managerial incentives are 
affected by the maximization of stakeholder value (including social and environmental value). Jensen 
(2001: 14) writes, “it is the failure to provide a criterion for making such tradeoffs (among stakeholders), 
or even to acknowledge the need for them, that makes stakeholder theory a prescription for destroying 
firm value and reducing social welfare”. 
  Given that the objective function of a manager is not well defined in stakeholder theory, the 
performance  of  managers  becomes  unaccountable.  Jensen  (2001)  argues  that  the  stakeholder  theory 
increases  the  agency  costs  and  weakens  the  internal  control  systems  of  firms,  because  performance 
measures are only vaguely described. Similarly, Tirole (2001: 26) writes, “In a nutshell, management can 
almost always rationalize any action by invoking its impact on the welfare of some stakeholder. An 
empire builder can justify a costly acquisition by a claim that the purchase will save a couple of jobs in 
the acquired firm; a manager can choose his brother-in-law as supplier on the grounds that the latter’s 
production process is environmentally friendly”. In addition, Tirole (2001) shows that the absence of a 
reliable performance measure leads to flat – rather than performance-based - managerial compensation 
contracts, which further weakens managerial incentives. 
Another problem of the stakeholder approach is that in a competitive market, a firm lowering its 
profits in order to pursue social and environmental goals may not survive competition or disciplinary 
actions by the market for corporate control. The reason is that another company can acquire this firm and 
replace the incumbent management with a value-maximizing one (Tirole (2001: 24)).  
To  conclude,  in  order  for  corporate  social  responsibility  to  become  a  workable  concept,  the 
following guidelines of performance yardsticks should be adopted:  
(1)  Corporate performance must be measurable. Lack of precisely formulated corporate goals 
and measures destroy firm value and social welfare in the long run. Firm value remains the single most 
important performance measure for management. 
                                                 
10 In Germany, for instance, the importance of stakeholders is even legally defined. German law mandates that the 
supervisory board is made up of representatives of the employees and unions, while the other half of the board 
consists of representatives of the major shareholders.   10
(2)  Maximizing long-run firm value is in line with maximizing social welfare. Tirole (2001) 
concludes  that  focusing  on  shareholder  value  is  a  second-best  optimum  once  managerial  incentive 
problems like agency costs have been incorporated in a stakeholder framework. 
(3)  Even if one adopts the shareholder value criterion, it is important to consider the welfare 
of all stakeholders (including employees, the community and the environment) as firm behavior induces 
important externalities. Jensen (2001) notes, “we cannot maximize the long-term market value of an 
organization if we ignore or mistreat any important constituency (stakeholder)”.  
(4)  Economic theory predicts that companies will be more willing to sacrifice profits in order 
to  be  socially  responsible,  when  their  management  is  entrenched  or  shielded  from  anti-takeover 
mechanisms. The reason is that these managers are less likely to be replaced by profit-maximizing ones. 
 
c. The impact of SRI on firm behavior 
Given that negative screening is the most common practice in SRI (see Section 2.4), it is interesting 
to study whether or not this approach achieves the goal of promoting social responsibility. In other words, 
we ask the question whether SRI affects corporate behavior, or whether the SRI’s benefit is only a feel-
good sentiment created by not being involved in unethical corporate behavior. To answer this question, 
Heinkel, Krause and Zechner (2001) developed a theoretical model that captures the effects of negative 
SRI screening on a polluting firm’s economic behavior. The assumptions of this model are: (i) investors 
are risk averse and consist of two types: green investors and neutral investors, and (ii) each firm has one 
of two technologies: a clean technology and a polluting one. The basic question is whether the presence of 
green investors can cause firms to alter their corporate behavior, i.e. to change from using a polluting 
technology to a clean one. The model shows that the question is answered affirmatively: if fund managers 
adopt negative screens, polluting firms are present in fewer investment portfolios, which reduces risk-
sharing opportunities among investors. Hence, the stock price of polluting firms falls, thus raising their 
cost of capital (expected return). When the increased cost of capital exceeds the cost of capital of socially 
responsible firms (in this case, the ones which transferred to a less polluting technology), polluting firms 
tend to turn more environmentally friendly. In a follow-up paper, Barnea, Heinkel and Krause (2005) 
investigate the effects of negative pollution screening on the investment decisions of polluting firms. The 
issue is examined in an equilibrium setting with endogenous investment decisions, i.e. firms are allowed 
to choose the level of investment. The study concludes that negative screening reduces the incentives of 
polluting firms to invest, which lowers the total level of investment in the economy. 
 
3.2 Empirical Evidence: Which SRI Screens Can Enhance Value? 
 
Given that economic theory tells us that firms should be “socially responsible” to the extent that it 
helps maximizing firm value, the crucial question is which SRI screens enhance firm value and which do 
not.  In  other  words,  we  ask  the  question  which  investment  screens  are  likely  to  improve  SRI  fund   11
performance.  We  define  corporate  social  responsibility  as  the  sum  of  good  corporate  governance 
(protecting  shareholders’  interests),  environmental  efficiency  (protecting  environmental  stakeholders’ 
interest), and good stakeholder relations (protecting the interests of other stakeholders, including those of 
employees and the local community). In this subsection, we review the literature on the value-relevance 
of corporate social responsibility, and try to identify which of these three components are likely to be 
value drivers.  
 
a. Corporate Governance Screening 
Corporate  governance  addresses  the  conflicts  of  interests  between  an  agent  (manager)  and  a 
principal (investor). This conflict of interest is induced by the separation of ownership and control in the 
modern corporation, and can bring about important agency costs. Managers may exert insufficient effort 
in enhancing shareholders’ value (moral hazard), enjoy building corporate empires and extract private 
benefits of control, or entrench themselves by anti-takeover provisions such that (dispersed) shareholders 
are  not  able  to  exercise  control.  These  agency  costs  are  at  odds  with  the  definition  of  corporate 
governance formulated by Shleifer and Vishny (1997): corporate governance consists of “the ways in 
which  the  suppliers  of  finance  to  corporations  assure  themselves  of  getting  a  fair  return  on  their 
investment.” Tirole (2001) takes a broader view and defines corporate governance as “the design of 
institutions that induce or force management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders.” 
The empirical literature shows that there is a positive relation between corporate governance and a 
firm’s value. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) (hereafter GIM) study the relation between a set of 24 
corporate-governance (anti-takeover) provisions and a firm’s long-run performance in the 1990s. Since 
the governance structures of a firm are not exogenous, the paper makes no claim about the direction of 
causality between governance and performance, but rather analyzes whether or not corporate governance 
is associated with firm value. A striking relation between corporate governance and stock returns is 
uncovered: a strategy (i.e. an investment screen) that involves buying firms with the strongest shareholder 
rights and selling firms with the weakest shareholder rights generates an annual abnormal return of 8.5% 
over the 1990s. The return is measured by the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (see Section 4.2). 
In addition, the governance index is highly correlated with firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q). 
These findings can be interpreted as follows: (i) the stock market underestimates the agency costs 
induced by the corporate provisions that reduce shareholder rights, (ii) managers have private information 
(not  shared  with  investors)  that  future  firm  performance  will  be  poor,  so  they  may  use  corporate 
provisions to entrench themselves and reduce shareholder rights, (iii) the significant abnormal returns 
generated by corporate governance screening may be not due to market-inefficiency, but rather capture 
the premium of some risk factors that is missing in the current asset pricing models. 
 The GIM’s approach of defining corporate governance as a set of anti-takeover provisions has 
limitations.  Cremers  and  Nair  (2005)  extend  GIM’s  work  by  classifying  corporate  governance 
mechanisms into external governance (takeover vulnerability) and internal governance (the presence of   12
institutional blockholders), and investigate how the interaction of these two governance mechanisms is 
associated with equity returns. In particular, the authors use two proxies for internal governance: the 
percentage of shares owned by institutional blockholders, and the percentage of shares owned by public 
pension funds. The paper finds that internal and external governance are complements in relation to stock 
returns: an investment strategy (screen) based on shareholder rights (external governance) generates an 
annualized  abnormal  return  of  10-15%  when  blockholder  ownership  is  high  (internal  governance). 
Similarly,  an  investment  strategy  based  on  firm’s  internal  governance  mechanism  yields  annualized 
abnormal returns of 8% when external governance mechanism is strong (i.e. in firms with few anti-
takeover provisions).       
It is interesting to study if the same pattern appears in other corporate governance regimes. Bauer, 
Gunster and Otten (2004) apply the GIM methodology to European data. Corporate governance data are 
obtained from the Deminor Corporate Governance Ratings, which covers 269 firms included in the FTSE 
Eurotop  300  for the  years  of  2000  and  2001. For the  period  1997-2000, the governance  ratings  are 
assumed to be constant over time. The authors use the overall governance ratings from Deminor, which 
are the aggregates of 300 criteria covering shareholder rights, takeover defense, information disclosure 
and board structure. The paper shows that good corporate governance leads to higher stock returns and 
higher firm value in Europe. In addition, contrary to the findings of GIM, the paper reports a negative 
relation between corporate governance standards and earnings measures (like ROE).
11 
 
b. Environmental Screening 
Although simple economic logic suggests that a stringent environmental standard can increase the 
production costs and thus hurt corporate profitability, a growing body of empirical literature reports a 
positive relation between corporate environmental performance and firm value. Researchers use various 
methods to study the effect of environmental performance on value. First, an event study was performed 
to examine the information content of corporate news on environmental issues. For example, Klassen and 
McLaughlin  (1996)  find  significant  positive  abnormal  returns  after  a  firm  receives  environmental 
performance awards, and significant negative returns after an environmental crisis.  
Second,  using  Tobin’s  Q  as  a  measure  of  firm  value,  some  studies  investigate  if  higher 
environmental standards are associated with a higher market value. Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000) find 
that US-based multinational enterprises adopting a stringent global environmental standard have much 
higher  market  values  than  firms  with  less  stringent  standards.  Konar  and  Cohen  (2001)  decompose 
                                                 
11 While the above corporate governance studies focus on well-developed market economies such as the US and 
Europe, Claessens (1997) investigates the relation between corporate governance and equity prices in the context of 
the  transition  of  centrally  planned  economies  to  market  economies.  He  reports  that  the  prices  of  privatization 
vouchers depend upon ownership structures: the more concentrated ownership, the higher the prices. However, 
when an investment bank holds a relatively large share stake (which suggests conflicts of interests), the equity (i.e. 
voucher) prices are relatively low.   13
Tobin’s  Q  into  tangible  asset  value  and  intangible  asset  value  and  find  that  poor  environmental 
performance is negatively correlated with the intangible asset value. 
Third, the empirical literature has recently begun to measure the relation between stock returns and 
environmental  performance.  Derwall,  Gunster,  Bauer  and  Koedijk  (2005)  construct  equity  portfolios 
based on environmental performance criteria, namely the “eco-efficiency” scores from Innovest Strategic 
Value Advisors, and measure the performance of these portfolios by the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor 
model  (see  Section  4.2).  A  portfolio  of  firms  with  high  environmental  scores  (based  on  positive 
screening) outperforms a portfolio of firms with low scores by 6% per annum over the period 1997-2003. 
The  authors  give  two  potential  explanations:  (i)  the  stock  market  undervalues  the  environmental 
information, and (ii) the eco-efficiency premium captures the premium of some missing risk factors in 
asset pricing models.    
 
c. Stakeholder Relation Screening 
The empirical studies on corporate social responsibility (CSR) have focused on the valuation effect 
of CSR. For instance, Hillman and Keim (2001) investigate the valuation effect of CSR on market value 
added (MVA) which is the difference between the market value of equity and the book value of assets 
(Stewart, 1996). The authors argue that CSR consists of two components: the first (called ‘stakeholder 
management’) refers to improving the relationships with primary stakeholders like employees, customers, 
suppliers and communities, while the second refers to ‘social issue participation’ like a ban on nuclear 
energy,  avoidance  of  ‘sin’  industries  (such  as  gambling,  pornography),  and  not  doing  business  in 
countries  with  bad  human  rights  records.  Hillmann  and  Keim  show  that  management  focusing  on 
stakeholder  value  also  create  shareholder  value.  In  contrast,  social  issue  participation  often  destroys 
shareholder value.  
Furthermore, the existence of a major shareholder may have an impact on the level of stakeholder 
management and social issue participation of a company. For instance, major shareholders are visible to 
outsiders and may therefore become the target of social activism. Using detailed ownership data and data 
on corporate social responsibility of the S&P 500 firms, Goergen and Renneboog (2002) investigate the 
impact of ownership on CSR but fail to find a relation between control concentration and CSR. 
To conclude this subsection, we summarize the empirical findings of corporate finance and strategy 
literature on corporate social responsibility. The following components of CSR can enhance shareholder 
value and thus social welfare: good corporate governance, sound environmental standards, and care of 
stakeholder relations. Participating in other social and ethical issues is likely to destroy firm value.  
 
4 Performance Evaluation of Mutual Funds 
   14
In  Section  3  we  have  discussed  firm-level  evidence  on  corporate  social  responsibility.  Before 
introducing empirical findings of portfolio-level studies on socially responsible investments in Section 5, 
we review the econometric methodologies used to evaluate mutual fund performance.  
 
4.1 Mean-Variance Analysis 
 
Performance measurement refers to the practice of detecting whether or not a fund manager has 
special  skills  to  beat  a  passive  benchmark  portfolio.  We  evaluate  mutual  fund  performance  from  a 
portfolio perspective: an investor desires to maximize the risk-adjusted returns of his portfolio.  
 
a. Mean-Variance Optimization 
Consider a mean-variance optimizing investor who currently invests in K risky assets. Let the 
expected return and the covariance matrix of the K-dimensional asset return vector Rt be given by  R m  and 
RR ￿  respectively, and the vector of initial portfolio weights is denoted as  R w . For a risk-averse investor, 
the mean-variance objective function in terms of certainty equivalence (i.e. the expected return that would 
make the investor indifferent from a riskless return), is: 
R RR R R R w w w CE ￿ - = '
2
1
' g m               (1) 
where ￿ is the investor’s constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) coefficient (it is assumed that ￿ >0). A 
mean-variance efficient portfolio is obtained by maximizing Eq. (1) with respect to wR   subject to the 
portfolio constraint  1 ' = K R w i , where  K i is a K-dimensional vector of ones. It follows that the optimal 
weighting vector  R w
* of the mean-variance portfolio is 
) (  
1 -1 *
K R RR R w hi m g - ￿ =
-                (2) 
where ￿ is the expected return on the zero beta portfolio of 
*
R w , which can be obtained as the intercept of 
the line tangent to the mean-variance frontier at 
*
R w (in the mean-standard deviation space). Because of 
the constraint  1 ' = K R w i , it is straightforward to show from Eq. (2) that the zero beta rate ￿ depends on 
the risk aversion coefficient ￿. This implies that each mean-variance efficient portfolio 
*
R w  is uniquely 
determined when either ￿ or ￿ is known. The zero beta rate ￿ also equals the inverse of the expectation of 
a stochastic discount factor (Cochrane (2001:108)). Note that when there exists a risk free asset in the 
economy, the zero beta rate ￿ for every investor can be replaced by the risk-free rate as the mean-variance 
frontier becomes a straight line. 
We now consider the case when an investor extends her initial set of K assets by adding a set of N 
mutual funds. The expected return and the covariance matrix of the N-dimensional fund return vector rt is   15
denoted by  r m  and  rr ￿  respectively, and the covariance matrix with the set of initial assets is given by 
rR ￿ . Below, the variables referring to the returns of initial assets (Rt) and mutual funds (rt) are labeled 
with subscript R and r, respectively. Variables that refer to the larger return set (Rt, rt) do not have a 
subscript. Thus, the K+N dimensional weight vector of the extended set is referred to as w. If the investor 
cannot extend the mean-variance frontier by investing in the set of N mutual funds, the optimal weight on 
each of the N mutual funds would be zero. In this case, the extended optimal weight vector w
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where 0N is a N dimensional vector of zeros. Substituting (2) into (3) gives 
N K R N r B 0 ) ( ) ( = - - - hi m hi m              (4) 
where 
1 - ￿ ￿ º RR rR B is an N´K matrix (see Ter Horst (1998: 40)). If Eq. (4) is valid, the optimal portfolio 
weight in the K+N assets coincides with the initial optional weight in K assets. In this case, it suggests 
that the two mean-variance frontiers will intersect at the investor’s initial portfolio location.  
 
b. Generalized Jensen’s alpha 
Eq. (4) has important implications for the performance measurement of mutual funds. The left hand 
side  of  Eq.  (4)  ,  ) ( ) ( ) ( K R N r J B hi m hi m h a - - - º     (5),  generalizes  the  original  Jensen’s  alpha 
proposed by Jensen (1968). The original alpha-measure requires that an investor’s benchmark assets are a 
risk free deposit and the market portfolio (see Section 4.2 for details). In that case the zero beta rate is 
equal  to  the  risk  free  rate.  In  contrast,  the  generalized  alpha-measure  ) (h aJ   does  not  assume  that 
investors initially hold a risk free deposit and the market portfolio.  ) (h aJ  depends on the zero beta rate ￿ 
and thus the risk aversion coefficient ￿. A positive  ) (h aJ  indicates that the corresponding mutual fund 
outperforms the benchmark assets, while a negative one detects underperformance of the mutual fund. It 
is straightforward to show that an investor who holds the K benchmark assets can extend the mean-
variance frontier by taking a long position in a fund with a positive  ) (h aJ  and a short position in a fund 
with a negative  ) (h aJ .  
When the generalized Jensen’s alpha equals zero (i.e. Eq. (4) holds), it is important to distinguish 
between two cases. First, Eq. (4) only holds for one value of zero beta rate ￿. This implies that the mean-
variance  frontiers  of  the  K  assets  and  the  K+N  assets  have  only  one  point  in  common  (i.e.  the 
intersection). The initial mean-variance efficient portfolio 
*
R w  of the investor with zero beta rate ￿ is also 
efficient for the extended set of K+N assets. Second, if Eq. (4) holds for any value of zero beta rate ￿,   16
implying that the two mean-variance frontiers coincide at every point (i.e. mean-variance spanning). In 
this case the following testable condition holds, 
0 = - R r Bm m  and  0 = - N K B i i              (6) 
and the initial mean-variance efficient portfolio 
*
R w  is also efficient on the extended set of K+N assets, 
independent of the risk aversion coefficient.  
The  hypothesis  that  the  generalized  Jensen’s  alpha  equals  zero  can  be  tested  with  an  OLS 
regression: 
t t t BR r e a + + =                  (7) 
where  R r Bm m a - =  and  t e is the idiosyncratic error term that is genetically uncorrelated with Rt and has 
a  covariance  matrix  ee ￿ .  In  this  case,  h i i a h a ) ( ) ( K N J B - - = .  Note  that  Eq.  (7)  is  essentially  a 
multifactor  model.  The  null  hypothesis  that  the  initial  efficient  frontier  intersects  with  the  extended 
frontier at the point of zero beta rate being ￿ can be formulated by: 
0 ) ( : 0 = - - h i i a K N B H               (8) 
while the null hypothesis that the initial frontier spans the extended frontier is:  
0 : 0 = a H  and  0 = - N K B i i               (9) 
Both hypotheses can be tested using a standard Wald test. A rejection of the hypotheses implies that 
the mutual fund outperforms or underperforms (in terms of mean-variance efficiency) the K benchmark 
assets. The intuition of the restriction in Eq. (9) is that the benchmark assets can form a portfolio that has 
the same expected return but lower variance than the mutual funds under consideration. Thus if Eq. (9) 
holds,  any  mean-variance  investor  initially  holding  the  K  risky  assets  cannot  extend  the  investment 
opportunity set by investing in the N mutual funds.  
Note that when both rt and Rt in the regression (7) are excess returns or returns of zero-investment 
spreads, the condition that benchmark assets form an investment portfolio, i.e.  0 = - N K B i i , is satisfied 
automatically. In this case, a test of whether or not the initial frontier of benchmark assets spans or 
intersects the extended frontier by investing in mutual funds is equivalent to a test of whether  0 = a .     
 
c. Generalized Sharpe Ratio 
Another frequently used measure of mutual fund performance is the Sharpe ratio which is defined 
as the excess return of a portfolio (i.e. expected return minus the risk free rate) per unit of standard 
deviation  risk
12  (Sharpe  (1966)).  We  can  easily  generalize  the  Sharpe  ratio  for  a  portfolio  with  K 
benchmark assets: 
                                                 
12 A related performance measure is the Treynor Ratio, defined as a portfolio’s excess return per unit of its market 













h q                 (10) 
As discussed above, when a risk free asset exists, the zero beta rate ￿ for every investor can be 
replaced by the risk free rate. Note that in a mean - standard deviation space, the Sharpe ratio of a mean-
variance efficient portfolio w
* is the slope of the tangent line at w
*. Hence, the mean-variance optimization 
of a portfolio is equivalent to maximization of the Sharpe ratio.  
The Sharpe ratio is obtained by using the expected return and variance of a portfolio, while the 
generalized Jensen’s alpha takes into account the covariance of a portfolio with an initial set of assets (Eq. 
(5)). The Sharpe ratios answer the question whether a portfolio should be preferred over another portfolio, 
whereas Jensen’s alpha answers the question whether an investor who currently holds K assets should 
invest in N new assets. However, there is a close relation between the two measures: 
) ( )' ( ) ( ) (
1 2 2 h a h a h q h q ee J J K K N
-
+ ￿ + =             (11) 
where  ) (
2 h q K N+  and  ) (
2 h qK  are the squared Sharpe ratios of the mean-variance efficient portfolios of 
N+K  assets  and  K  assets  respectively,  and  where  ) (h a J   and  ee ￿ can  both  be  obtained  from  the 
regression (7).  
It follows from Eq. (11) that Jensen’s alpha determines the potential improvement in the maximum 
attainable Sharpe ratio, i.e. the Sharpe ratio of the mean-variance efficient portfolio including the N new 
assets. Thus a positive Jensen’s alpha also implies benefits from portfolio diversification: by combining 
the mutual funds under consideration and the benchmark assets, an investor can obtain a portfolio with a 
higher Sharpe ratio than the one that can be obtained by investing only in benchmark assets. 
 
4.2 Performance Evaluation Methodologies 
 
As discussed in Section 4.1, mutual fund performance evaluation requires an appropriate set of 
benchmark  assets. Asset  pricing  models,  from  equilibrium  models such as the  Capital Asset  Pricing 
Model (CAPM) to models such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), use different benchmarks of 
assets. The benchmark assets can be interpreted as factor-mimicking portfolios of risk factors in the 
economy, such that a performance measure like the generalized Jensen’s alpha can be interpreted as a 
risk-adjusted return. The alpha represents a fund manager’s skill in selecting securities based on public 
and private information, to beat a passive factor-mimicking portfolio.    
 
a. CAPM 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model is an equilibrium model stating that the market risk is the only 
non-diversifiable risk factor in capital markets. If the CAPM holds, two benchmark assets, namely a 
market portfolio and a risk free asset, span the mean-variance frontier of all assets in the capital market. 
Although the validity of the CAPM has been questioned, the Jensen’s alpha computed using a single   18
market index is still a popular measure for mutual fund performance (e.g. Morningstar reports alphas 
based  on  a  single  market  index).  In  this  traditional  way  of  performance  evaluation,  the  following 
regression is estimated by an OLS regression: 
  t i t f
m
t i i M t f t i r r r r , , , , , ) ( e b a + - + = -             (12) 
where  t i r,  is the return on mutual fund i over time t, 
m
t r  is the return of a broad market index and  t f r ,  is 
return on a risk free deposit.  i M , a  is the original Jensen’s alpha introduced by Jensen (1968) and is 
equivalent to the generalized Jensen’s alpha (Eq. (5)) with the zero beta rate being the risk free rate. As 
mentioned in Section 4.1, testing whether  0 , = i M a  is equivalent to testing whether a risk free deposit and 
the market portfolio span the extended efficient frontier including the possibility to invest in the mutual 
fund (in this case, the restriction that portfolio weights ought to sum to one disappears as the risk free 
asset acts as a benchmark asset). A positive alpha implies that an investor who invests in a risk free 
deposit and a market portfolio can extend the investment opportunity set by taking a long position in the 
mutual fund, whereas a negative alpha suggests that a short position in the fund yields a higher risk-
adjusted return. If the CAPM holds,  i M , a  represents the skill of a fund manager in selecting mispriced 
securities. Alternatively,  i M , a  can be interpreted as the excess fund return adjusted for the market risk, 
while the mutual fund’s exposure to the market risk is measured by  i b  (in Eq. (12)).  
 
b. Multifactor Models 
As a single factor of the market risk may not adequately characterize the behavior of expected 
equity  returns,  Fama  and  French  (1993)  propose  a  three-factor  model  to  capture  the  cross-sectional 
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where 
smb
t r is the difference in returns between a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big stocks, 
and 
hml
t r  is the difference in returns between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of 
low book-to-market stocks. Testing whether or not  0 , = i FF a  is equivalent to testing whether or not the 
mean-variance frontier of the extended set of assets coincides with the frontier of a risk free deposit, the 
market portfolio, the spread between small and big stocks, and the spread between high and low book-to-
market stocks. Note that as both 
smb
t r  and 
hml
t r are zero-investment portfolios and a risk free asset exists, 
the portfolio constraint of the spanning test is satisfied. Alternatively,  ) ( ,t f
m
t r r - , 
smb
t r  and 
hml
t r  can be 
interpreted  as  three  zero-investment  factor  mimicking  portfolios,  such  that  i FF, a   is  the  fund  return 
adjusted for the three risk factors.    19
 Fama and French (1996) report that their three-factor model cannot explain the anomaly of the 
continuation of short-term returns. Carhart (1997) extends the Fama-French model by adding a 
momentum factor:  






t si t f
m
t mi i C t f t i r r r r r r r ,
1




1 is the current month’s difference in returns between the previous year’s best-performing and 
worst-performing stocks. From the mean-variance framework described in Section 4.1, it follows that an 
investor initially holds a risk free deposit, a market portfolio, 
smb
t r  and 
hml
t r , and follows a momentum 
strategy. Testing whether or not  0 , = i C a  is equivalent to testing whether the mean-variance frontier 
coincides with the initial frontier after adding the mutual fund. Alternatively, Eq. (14) can be interpreted 
as a pricing model with four risk factors, namely the market, size, book-to-market and momentum.  
 
c. Conditional Strategies 
Up to  now,  we  have assumed  that  the  expected  returns  and  co-variances  of mutual  funds  and 
benchmark assets are constant over time. However, the expected returns of stocks and bonds may be time-
variant (Keim and Stambaugh (1986)). Public information on the economic condition, such as interest 
rates and stock dividend yields, can predict the changes in expected returns over time. In the mean-
variance  analysis  framework  introduced  in  Section  4.1,  mean-variance  optimizing  behavior  crucially 
depends on the first and second moments of returns. When expected returns change over time, so do the 
optimal portfolio weights and consequently the efficient frontier as well. This implies that an investor’s 
decision to invest in mutual funds depends on changing economic conditions. 
Ferson  and  Schadt  (1996)  propose  a  simple  method  to  incorporate  conditional  information  in 
measuring mutual fund performance. Consider the case of one mutual fund and two benchmark assets, 
namely a risk free deposit and a market portfolio. Assume that the exposure to market risk ( t i, b ) is a 
linear combination of a time-constant beta ( 0 i b ) and a time-varying beta ( 1 1 ' - t i z b ):  t i, b = 1 1 0 ' - + t i i z b b , 
where  1 - t z is an information set including L variables that reflect the current state of the economy. Both 
1 i b  and  1 - t z are L dimensional row vectors, and consequently  1 1 ' - t i z b  and  t i, b  are time-varying scalars. 
Frequently used information variables are short-term T-bill rates, dividend yields of a market index, term 
spread (the difference in the yield between long and short term bonds), and the corporate bond yield 
spread (the difference in yield between low and high grade bonds). The conditional one factor model is 
estimated via an OLS regression:  
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where  ) ( ' , 1 t f
m
t t r r z - - can be interpreted as the excess return of investing  1 - t z units in the market portfolio 
at period t. Compared to the unconditional one-factor model of Eq. (12), the conditional one-factor model   20
has L+1 factors. It is straightforward to extend the above conditional model to a conditional K factor 
model. The model has (L+1)*K factors to estimate, which is a disadvantage of this model induced by a 
degrees-of-freedom problem. Similar to other multifactor models with a risk free asset, a test on the 
abnormal performance of a mutual fund is equivalent to testing whether  0 , = i FS a . A positive alpha 
indicates that an investor who follows a dynamic strategy to invest in the market portfolio and a risk free 
deposit, can extend the investment opportunity set by taking a long position in this fund, whereas a 
negative alpha implies a short position.  
 
d. Seemingly Unrelated Assets 
As  discussed  above,  Equations  (12),  (13)  and (14)  can  be  interpreted  as  (multi-)factor  pricing 
models, in which the benchmark assets are factor-mimicking portfolios. In this framework, a common 
interpretation of alpha, conditional on the validity of the pricing model, is that it represents the skills of a 
fund manager in selecting securities. However, Pastor and Stambaugh (2002b) argue that a non-zero alpha 
need not necessarily reflect the fund managers’ selection skills if some passive assets can also generate 
non-zero alphas. In that scenario, a fund manager could achieve a positive alpha without any selection 
skills by investing in non-benchmark passive assets with historically positive alphas. To evaluate the fund 
managers’ selection skills, Pastor and Stambaugh (2002a,b) propose to extend the Carhart (1997) model 
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where 
sua
t r is a 4-dimensional row vector of returns of the following four SUAs. The first seemingly 
unrelated  asset  is  a  characteristics-matched  spread  (denoted  as  CMS)  with  a  long  position  in  low 
hi b stocks (as measured by Eq. (13)) and a short position in high  hi b stocks. The other three seemingly 
unrelated passive assets (denoted as IP1,  IP2, and IP3) are constructed from a universe a 20 value-
weighted industry portfolios. The latter three portfolios mimic the first three principal components of the 
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t r . The inclusion of the passive asset CMS is motivated by the 
empirical evidence that CMS may be mispriced by the Fama-French three factors (Daniel and Titman 
(1997)). The returns of the three industry portfolios are expected to explain the additional variance of 
funds’ returns, e.g. when  0 ¹ ui b . .   
In this model, an investor holds a risk free deposit, a market portfolio, 
smb
t r  and 
hml
t r . She also 
follows a momentum strategy, and invests in four passive assets that could generate positive alphas (i.e. 
CMS) or explain the fund’s variance (i.e. IP1, IP2 and IP3). Testing whether  0 , = i PS a  is equivalent to 
testing whether the mean-variance frontier after adding the mutual fund coincides with that of the initial   21
investment opportunity set. Note that Eq. (16) cannot be interpreted as a pricing model, because 
sua
t r is 
the return on SUAs rather than on the mimicking portfolios of risk factors.  
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that the alpha in the Carhart (1997) model ( i C, a in Eq. 
(14)) can also be computed from the estimates of Eq. (16): 
i ui i PS i C a ' , , b a a + =                 (17) 
where  i PS, a and  ui b are obtained from regression (16), and ai is the intercept in a multiple regression of 
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1 . A non-zero ai indicates 
mispricing of SUA, which would lead to a non-zero  i C, a  if  0 ¹ ui b . In Eq. (17), the Carhart (1997) 
alpha  i C, a  is decomposed into two elements: the manager’s skills in active stock selection ( i PS, a ) and 
the exposure to the seemingly unrelated passive assets ( i ui a ' b ). 
 
e. Empirical Findings on Mutual Fund Performance 
Since the publication of Jensen (1968), academics have debated the issue whether or not active 
portfolio management adds value to investors. The majority of studies conclude that actively managed 
mutual  funds,  on  average,  underperform  passively  managed  portfolios  tracking  market  indices.  For 
example, Gruber (1996) finds that the average mutual fund in the US underperformed the market indices 
by 65 basis points per year over the period from 1985 to 1994. Furthermore, Carhart (1997) shows that 
fund returns are negatively correlated with fund expense levels and trading activities.  
Using a different approach, some studies investigate the performance of the stocks held in mutual 
fund portfolios, rather than the performance of mutual funds. These studies (e.g. Grinblatt and Titman 
(1989)) show that fund managers that actively trade possess significant stock-picking talent, i.e. fund 
managers have the ability to choose stocks that outperform their benchmarks. Wermers (2000) provides a 
comprehensive analysis of performance of US mutual funds over the period from 1975 to 1994. He finds 
that mutual funds hold stocks that outperform the market by 1.3% per annum, but the funds’ net returns 
(i.e. after deducting fees) underperform by 1% per annum. Of this 2.3% difference in performance, 0.7% 
is due to the underperformance of non-stock holdings (e.g. cash), 0.8% is due to fund expenses (i.e. 
management fees) and the other 0.8% can be explained by transaction costs. The results suggest that fund 
managers pick stocks well enough to cover their costs, which supports the claim that there is value in 
active portfolio management.  
 
4.3 Related Performance Measures 
 
The previous subsection presented various models which can evaluate whether or not a mutual fund 
manager has superior stock selection skills to beat a set of passive benchmark assets. In this section, we   22
discuss two additional methodologies used to evaluate mutual fund performance, namely a test of market-
timing ability and return-based style analysis. 
 
a.  Market-Timing 
Asset pricing models such as the CAPM predict that a portfolio’s excess return is a linear function 
of the excess return of the market portfolio. However, if a mutual fund manager has the ability to time the 
market, i.e. to increase the fund’s exposure to the market portfolio prior to a market increase and to 
decrease the exposure prior to a market decline, the fund’s return will be a non-linear function of the 
market return. To test for the market-timing ability of a fund manager, Treynor and Mazuy (1966) add a 
quadratic term to the standard CAPM regression in Eq. (12): 
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where  i TM , g measures timing ability. If a mutual fund manager increases the fund’s market exposure prior 
to a market increase or reduces the market exposure prior to a market decline, the fund’s return will be a 
convex function of the market return, and  i TM , g will be positive.  
Henriksson and Merton (1981) propose to test the market-timing ability by employing the following 
regression: 
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t r r I >  is an indicator variable that equals one if  t f
m
t r r , > and zero if  t f
m
t r r , £ . In this 
model, a fund manager decides between two levels of market exposure:  i b is the fund’s market exposure 
when the excess return of the market portfolio is negative, and  i HM i , g b + is the market exposure when 
the  excess  market  return  is  positive.  Consequently,  i HM , g measures  the  difference  in  the  exposures 
between during the market upturn and the downturn. A positive  i HM , g indicates that the fund manager is 
able to time the market.
13  
 
b. Return-based Style Analysis 
It is widely known that asset allocation is important in determining the return of an investor’s 
portfolio. Asset allocation is referred to as the determination of the portfolio weights across a number of 
                                                 
13 Note that the non-linear terms in Eq. (18) and (19) are not returns on benchmark assets or investment 
strategies, and consequently the alphas in both tests of timing ability do not answer the question whether or not an 
investor can extend the mean-variance frontier of initial assets by investing in the mutual fund. A positive  i TM , g or 
i HM , g can be interpreted as market-timing ability of a mutual fund manager. The above two studies analyze monthly 
returns of mutual funds and find little evidence of timing ability. However, using daily returns of mutual funds, 
Bollen and Busse (2001) demonstrate that mutual funds exhibit significant timing ability. 
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asset classes. Examples of such asset classes are growth stocks, value stocks, bonds, sector portfolios or 
country portfolios. Although mutual funds report their investment objectives (styles), the actual asset 
allocation of mutual funds does not always correspond to the reported style (Brown and Goetzmann 
(1997)). Return-based style analysis, introduced by Sharpe (1992), is a popular way to estimate mutual 
funds’ investment styles and exposures to major asset classes. In style analysis, the following regression 
is estimated:   
t i t i i t i R r , , e b a + + =                 (20) 
s.t.  1 ' = K i i b                   (20a) 
0 ³ i b                     (20b) 
where ri,t is the return of mutual fund i in period t, Rt is the return of K asset classes, and  t i, e is the 
idiosyncratic fund return independent of all K asset classes, implying that OLS estimates of  i a  and 
i b are consistent.  
Regression (20) under both the portfolio restriction (Eq. (20a)) and the no short-selling constraint 
(Eq. (20b)) is referred to as strong style analysis.  t i i , e a + is also known as the tracking error, which 
measures the difference in expected return between the mutual fund and the mimicking portfolio. Thus, 
i a  is the average tracking error.  i b  reflects the relative portfolio weight of the mimicking portfolio, a 
portfolio that yields the lowest tracking error variance. Semi-strong style analysis refers to the case when 
only a portfolio constraint is imposed, and weak style analysis is referred to the case without constraints.  
In the semi-strong style analysis, De Roon, Nijman and Ter Horst (2004) show that the  i a  equals 
the generalized Jensen’s alpha (Eq. (5)) of an investor with the zero-beta rate being the expected return on 
the Global Minimum-Variance (GMV) portfolio. If one of the benchmark assets is a risk free deposit, the 
return on the GMV portfolio equals the risk-free rate. In this case, ri,t and Rt in Eq. (20) can be replaced by 
the returns in excess of the risk-free rate, and testing whether  0 = i a  is equivalent to testing whether the 
initial frontier of K benchmark assets spans the frontier of the extended assets.   
In the strong style analysis, the interpretation of alpha is similar to semi-strong style analysis, 
except  that  the  benchmark  portfolios  become  the  subset  of  benchmark  assets for  which  the  positive 
constraints  are  not  binding.  Note  that  if  the  actual  factor  loadings  are  positive,  the  no  short-selling 
constraint leads to efficiency gains; otherwise imposing the no short-selling constraint may lead to biased 
estimates of factor loadings. Moreover, given that the estimated style coefficients are truncated at zero, 
the confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients should to be adjusted as the standard errors are not 
normally distributed. Note that style analysis uses a multifactor model to explain fund returns, which only 
works well if fund returns are highly correlated with the returns of benchmark assets. Sharpe (1992)   24




5.  Portfolio-level Analysis on SRI 
 
Most  academic  research  on  socially  responsible  investments  focuses  on  analyzing  their 
performance. Whether SRI portfolios underperform or outperform their conventional peers is the major 
research question. In this section, we review the empirical findings on the performance and money-flows 
of socially responsible mutual funds. 
 
5.1  Research Hypotheses and Methodologies 
 
Ethical funds apply various screening processes to retain stocks complying with specific social, 
environmental, ethical and corporate governance criteria. These screens may have important implications 
for the performance of ethical funds. Essentially, there are three hypotheses about the performance of SRI 
portfolios relative to non-SRI portfolios. The first two hypotheses are about risk-adjusted returns (alphas), 
while the last hypothesis is about the risk exposures (betas) of SRI portfolios. 
The  first  hypothesis  is  that  SRI  portfolios  underperform  conventional  portfolios.  SRI  screens 
impose a constraint on the investment universe that is available to non-SRI investors. This constraint 
limits the diversification possibilities and consequently shifts the mean-variance frontier towards less 
favorable  risk-return  tradeoffs  than  those  of  conventional  portfolios.  Hong  and  Kacperczyk  (2005) 
nevertheless show that ‘sin’ stocks in the US, i.e. companies involved in producing alcohol, tobacco and 
gambling,  have  historically  outperformed the  stock  market by  9.1%  per annum.  Divesting from  this 
underpriced ‘sin’ part of the stock market may negatively influence the risk-return tradeoffs of the SRI 
funds in comparison to conventional funds. Moreover, the SRI screening processes bring about additional 
expenses to fund investors, which also reduce SRI returns. Note that this hypothesis implies that more 
stringent social screening will lead to a less favorable financial performance.  
The second hypothesis is that SRI portfolios outperform their conventional peers. As discussed in 
Section 3, the empirical research shows that the information on corporate governance and environmental 
performance may be underpriced by the stock markets. Portfolios constructed by means of corporate 
governance,  environmental  and  social  criteria  may  outperform  their  benchmarks.  Therefore,  SRI 
screening processes generate value-relevant non-public information that helps fund managers to select 
securities and consequently generate better risk-adjusted returns (alphas) than conventional mutual funds. 
                                                 
14 In the case of hedge funds, there should be no short-selling constraint (Eq. (20b)). The portfolio constraint (Eq. 
(20a)) can bias the estimates of style analysis as hedge funds actually use leverage and short-selling strategies. In 
addition, hedge funds have low correlations with major asset classes. To account for this problem, Fung and Hsieh 
(1997) extract five principal components from hedge fund returns, and construct five style factors whose returns are 
highly correlated with the principal components.   25
This is the case where investors are doing (financially) well while doing (socially) good, i.e. investors 
earn positive risk-adjusted returns while at the same time participating in a just cause. There are two 
arguments  supporting  this  ’outperformance’  hypothesis:  first,  sound  social  and  environmental 
performance  is  a  positive  signal  of  good  managerial  skills,  which  translates  into  favorable  financial 
performance; second, social and environmental screening reduces the possibility of incurring high costs 
during corporate social crises or environmental disasters. These arguments imply that more stringent 
social  screening  may  lead  to  better  financial  performance.  A  key  assumption  underlying  the 
‘outperformance’ hypothesis is that conventional portfolio managers do not use the above value-relevant 
information, which is at odds with the market efficiency story.  
The third hypothesis is that SRI portfolios have different risk exposures and therefore different 
expected returns than conventional portfolios. Social and environmental factors may be correlated with 
pricing risk factors. For example, companies with sound environmental performance may have a lower 
book-to-market ratio than companies with poor environmental performance (Dowell, Hart and Yeung 
(2000)). Consequently, an environmentally responsible portfolio may have a lower risk exposure to the 
book-to-market factor in the Fama-French (1993) pricing model than a conventional portfolio. Therefore 
the risk exposures and expected return of an SRI portfolio may be different from those of a conventional 
portfolio. Note that social, environmental or ethical screens may have a different impact on the risk 
exposures of SRI portfolios. 
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  methodology  used  to  evaluate  SRI  fund  performance  has 
evolved. Early research measures the performance of an SRI portfolio using a single index model like the 
CAPM (Luther, Matatko and Corner (1992), Hamilton, Joe and Statman (1993) and Sauer (1997)). In 
addition,  most  studies  compare  the  performance  of  SRI  funds  with  that  of  a  reference  group  of 
conventional mutual funds. It was common to identify the reference group by a “matched-pair” analysis: 
an SRI fund is matched to a conventional mutual fund with similar investment objective and fund size 
(Mallin et al. (1995), Gregory et al. (1997), Statman (2000), and Kreander et al. (2005)). Recently, several 
studies applied multifactor models, such as the four-factor model proposed by Fama and French (1993) 
and Carhart (1997) to evaluate SRI performance. Multifactor models provide important insights into the 
exposure of SRI mutual funds to pricing risk factors such as size, book-to-market and momentum factors 
(Bauer  et  al.  (2005),  and  Geczy  et  al.  (2003)).  We  will  discuss  the  findings  of  these  papers  in  the 
following sections.  
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5.2  Performance of SRI Funds in the US 
a.  Risk-Adjusted Returns of SRI funds   26
There are several studies evaluating SRI fund performance in the US. Hamilton, Joe and Statman 
(1993) investigate the performance of 32 SRI funds and 320 randomly selected non-SRI funds in the US 
for the period of 1981-1990. The CAPM-based Jensen’s alpha is measured against the value-weighted 
NYSE index. For the 17 SRI funds with a longer history, i.e. established before 1985, the average alpha is 
–0.06% per month, which is higher than the average monthly alpha (–0.14%) of the corresponding 170 
non-SRI funds. Meanwhile for the 15 SRI funds with a shorter history, i.e. established after 1985, the 
average alpha is –0.28% per month, which is worse than the average monthly alpha (–0.04%) of the 150 
non-SRI funds. Note that the difference in average alphas between SRI funds and non-SRI funds is not 
statistically significant. 
For the period of 1990-1998, Statman (2000) investigates the performance of 31 SRI funds in the 
US. The reference group contains 62 non-ethical funds that have a fund size similar to the ethical funds. 
The two groups of funds have similar average expense ratios: 1.50% for SRI funds and 1.56% for non-
SRI  one.  Jensen’s  alpha  is  measured  against  the  S&P  500  Index,  while  the  author  also  shows  that 
choosing the Domini 400 Social Index (DSI 400), the most well known SRI Index, as a benchmark does 
not change the results. The average monthly alpha is –0.42% for SRI funds and –0.62% for non-SRI 
funds, while the difference between them is not significant at the 5% level. The finding suggests that the 
performance of SRI funds is not significantly different from that of non-SRI funds, although investing in 
neither SRI funds nor non-SRI funds can extend the mean-variance frontier of initial assets including the 
market portfolio and a risk-free deposit. In addition, the paper also documents that the DSI 400 index has 
a higher Sharpe ratio than the S&P 500 index (0.97 vs. 0.92), which indicates that a mean-variance 
optimizing investor should prefer investing in the first index. 
 
b. Diversification Cost of Investing in SRI Funds 
 Comparing the average performance of SRI funds to that of non-SRI funds does not necessarily 
provide useful information to an investor who can selectively invest in a subset of mutual funds. Unlike 
the above-mentioned studies, Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003) investigate the diversification cost of 
an investor who invests in SRI funds but not in conventional mutual funds for the period 1963-2001. The 
authors  construct  optimal  portfolios  of  mutual  funds  for  mean-variance  investors  with  short-sale 
constraints. In a Bayesian framework, each optimization uses the predictive distribution of fund returns 
conditional upon a range of prior beliefs about model mispricing and manager skills. Then, the optimal 
portfolio of  funds  selected  from  35  SRI  funds  is compared to the  optimal  portfolio  selected  from a 
universe of 894 non-SRI funds. The diversification cost of imposing the SRI constraint is measured by the 
difference between the certainty-equivalent returns (Eq. (2)) on the two portfolios. This financial cost can 
be interpreted as a lower bound on the value of the non-financial utility that an investor should derive 
from socially responsible investing.  
This study reveals the significant financial costs of imposing the SRI constraint on mean-variance 
optimizing investors. It also demonstrates that the SRI cost depends on investors’ believes in asset pricing   27
models and fund managers’ stock-picking skills. To an investor who strongly believes in the CAPM and 
rules out selection skills, i.e. a market index investor, the financial cost of the SRI constraint is just 5 basis 
points per month. To an investor who still disallows skill but instead believes in multifactor pricing 
models such as the four-factor model, the cost of the SRI constraint is at least 30 basis points per month. 
The SRI constraint imposes large costs, more than 1.5% per month, on investors whose beliefs allow 
selection skill,  i.e. investors  who  rely  heavily  on  individual  funds’  historical risk-adjusted  returns to 
predict future performance. Moreover, further restricting the SRI universe to the funds that screen out 
“sin” stocks (e.g. alcohol, tobacco or gambling) increases the monthly cost of the SRI constraint by an 
additional 10 basis points. 
 In  addition,  Geczy  et  al. (2003)  also  show  that there  are important  differences  in  some  basic 
characteristics and the risk exposures between SRI and non-SRI funds. For the funds in their sample, the 
average expense ratio of SRI funds is higher than that of non-SRI funds (1.33% vs. 1.10%), whereas the 
average annual turnover of SRI funds is much lower than that of non-SRI funds (81.5% vs. 175.4%). The 
SRI funds have a smaller size than non-SRI funds: the average asset under management (across time and 
across funds) amounts to $149 million and $257 million, respectively. In order to make their results 
comparable to earlier research, the authors also compare the performance of an equally weighted portfolio 
of 35 SRI funds to an equally weighted portfolio of 894 non-SRI funds. The monthly alpha, measured by 
the Fama-French-Carhart model extended with seemingly unrelated assets (Eq. (16)), of the first portfolio 
is higher than that of the second one (0.21% vs. 0.08%), but the difference is insignificant. This finding is 
consistent with the results of other studies, namely that SRI funds perform no worse than non-SRI funds. 
Meanwhile, the risk exposure of the SRI portfolio to the size factor (SMB factor) is higher than that of the 
non-SRI portfolio (0.20 vs. 0.16). This implies that SRI funds are biased towards small-cap companies. 
The exposures to the momentum factor and book-to-market factor are similar for the two portfolios.  
 
c. Impact of Investment Screens on SRI Fund Performance 
The above-mentioned studies compare the performance of SRI funds with non-SRI ones, but they 
do not distinguish between SRI funds that use different investment screens. However, as discussed in 
Section 5.1, investment screens may affect the risk-exposures and risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds. In 
the academic literature, few attempts have been made to investigate the impact of investment screens on 
SRI fund performance. Goldreyer, Ahmed and Diltz (1999) study the performance of 49 SRI funds for the 
period of 1981–1997, which include 29 equity funds, 9 bond funds and 11 balanced funds. The average 
Jensen’s alpha of the 29 SRI equity funds is –0.49% per annum, whereas that of 20 non-SRI equity funds 
is  2.78%.  The  difference  between  the  two  average  alphas  is  not  significant,  which  indicates  the 
performance of these two groups of funds is not dissimilar. The most interesting finding of this paper is 
that the SRI funds using positive screens outperform SRI funds that do not employ positive screens. The 
average monthly alpha for equity SRI funds with and without positive screens is –0.11% and –0.81%, 
respectively. The difference is statistically significant with a t-statistic of 3.36. This finding, although it is   28
based  on  a  small  sample  of  29  funds,  supports  the  hypothesis  that  investment  screens  affect  the 
performance of SRI funds.  
A recent study by Barnett and Salomon (2006) examines whether or not more stringent social 
screens lead to better financial returns of 67 SRI funds. The authors document a non-linear relationship 
between fund performance and investment screens. When the number of social screens (both positive and 
negative ones) increases, the fund’s annual return declines at first, but then rebounds as the number of 
screens reaches a maximum. Note that this paper examines expected returns rather than risk-adjusted 
returns.  Given  that  the  expected  return  consists  of  both  risk-adjusted  returns  and  loadings  on  risk 
premium, it would be interesting to see how investment screens influence each of these two components 
separately.   
   
5.3  Performance of SRI Funds in the UK 
 
A few studies investigate the performance of ethical funds in the UK. Luther, Matatko and Corner 
(1992) study 15 ethical funds in the UK for the 1984-1990 period. Jensen’s alphas of the ethical funds 
have a mean of 0.03% per month, which is not significantly different from zero. This implies that ethical 
funds have a similar performance as the benchmark assets. The authors also document that the ethical 
funds have relatively high portfolio weights on small-cap companies. To control for the potential small-
cap bias of ethical funds, Luther and Matatko (1994) measure the Jensen’s alphas of 9 ethical funds in 
two ways, either against the FT All Share Index or against a Small-Cap Index. The authors find that the 
R-squared is higher in the first regression than the second one, which supports the hypothesis that the SRI 
portfolio is biased towards small-caps. Still, the average alphas measured in both these ways are not 
significantly different from zero.  
Unlike  the  above-mentioned  UK  studies,  Mallin,  Saadouni  and  Briston  (1995)  compare  the 
Jensen’s alphas of 29 ethical funds to those of 29 non-ethical funds with a similar fund size and age. The 
monthly alphas of ethical funds range from -0.28% to 1.21%, while 22 out of the 29 alphas are positive. 
The alphas of non-ethical funds, 23 of which are positive, range from -0.41% to 1.56% per month. There 
is little evidence that the two groups of funds have different risk-adjusted returns. Gregory, Matatko and 
Luther  (1997)  examine  18  ethical  funds  out  of  the  above  29  funds  for  the  1986-1994  period.  The 
reference group contains 18 non-ethical funds that have similar fund size, age, and investment area to the 
ethical funds. To account for the small-cap bias, Jensen’s alphas are calculated based on two factors, 
namely the FT All Shares Index and the Hoare Govett Small Cap Index. The two-factor model has a 
higher  adjusted  R-squared  than  the  single-factor  model,  and  that  most  of  the  ethical  funds  have  a 
significant exposure to the small-cap factor. The alphas of ethical funds range from –0.71% to 0.24% per 
month, but almost none are statistically significant. Moreover, in a regression with both ethical and non-
ethical funds, the indicator variable of ethical funds does not have significant impact on fund performance   29
after controlling for fund age, size, and the market risk. This implies that the difference in performance 
between an SRI fund and a non-SRI fund is again not statistically significant.  
 
5.4 Performance of International SRI Funds 
 
There are several recent studies investigating the performance of SRI funds in countries other than 
the US and UK. For the short period of 1996-1998, Kreander, Gray, Power and Sinclair (2005) study the 
performance of 40 SRI funds in Europe using weekly data. The countries covered in the sample include 
Belgium (1 fund), Germany (4 funds), Netherlands (2 funds), Norway (2 funds), Sweden (11 funds), 
Swiss (2 funds) and the UK (18 funds). The reference group to the SRI funds consists of 40 non-SRI 
funds that are from the same countries and have similar fund size, age, and investment universe as the SRI 
funds. The average Jensen’s alpha of SRI funds and non-SRI ones is similar (0.20% vs. 0.12% per 
month),  and  the difference is  statistically insignificant. This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  results  of 
previous studies showing that the performance of SRI funds and non-SRI funds are very similar. In 
addition,  the  authors  test  the  market  timing  ability  of  SRI  and  non-SRI  fund  managers,  using  the 
Henriksson and Merton (1981) model (Eq. (19)). The timing coefficients are also similar for the two types 
of funds (-0.29 vs. –0.28), and each of them is significant at the 0.05 level. However, the signs of the 
timing coefficients are negative, which seems to signify that both SRI and non-SRI fund managers time 
the market in the wrong direction.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005) compare the performance of 103 SRI funds with 4,384 non-SRI 
funds over the period 1990-2001. The SRI funds come from Germany (16 funds), the UK (32 funds) and 
the US (55 funds). The sample is survivorship free, as it includes dead funds (all of which are non-SRI 
funds). Ignoring dead funds would overestimate the average returns of the non-SRI funds in by 0.01%, 
0.02%, 0.03% per month for the three countries, respectively. Fund performance is measured by the four 
factor model (Eq. (14)). As documented in previous studies, ethical funds have a smaller size and charge 
higher management fees than conventional funds. The average monthly alphas of SRI funds are 0.29%, 
0.09% and –0.05% for German, UK domestic and US domestic funds, respectively. The US domestic 
ethical funds significantly underperform conventional domestic funds, while the difference between the 
US  international  ethical  funds  and the US  international  conventional  funds  is insignificant. The  UK 
ethical funds, both domestic and international funds, significantly outperform conventional funds. The 
difference  in  average  alphas  between  German  SRI  and  non-SRI  funds  is  insignificant.  The  authors 
conclude that there is little evidence that SRI funds significantly over- or underperform non-SRI funds. 
In addition, Bauer et al. (2005) also document that German and US ethical funds passed through a 
learning  phase:  after  significant  underperformance  in  the  beginning  of  the  1990s,  they  matched 
conventional fund performance over the 1998-2001 period. Older ethical funds (launched before the end   30
of 1997) outperform younger ethical funds (launched since 1998). Meanwhile, SRI funds have different 
risk exposures than non-SRI funds. German and UK ethical funds typically invest more in small-cap 
stocks than US ones. All SRI funds are more growth- than value-oriented. Another interesting finding is 
that while the older ethical funds clearly deviated from conventional funds with respect to the exposures 
to market risk, size and book-to-market factors, younger funds follow less pronounced investment styles.  
Another performance study of international SRI funds is performed by Schroder (2004). His sample 
includes 30 US funds and 16 German and Swiss funds. A two-factor model is employed with both a blue-
chip index and a small-cap index as benchmarks to estimate the alphas. The monthly alphas range from –
2.06% to 0.87%. Thirty-eight out of the 46 alphas are negative, but only 4 are significant at the 5% level. 
This suggests that SRI funds do not significantly underperform the benchmark portfolio consisting of 
both large stocks and small stocks. Using the strong-form style analysis introduced in Section 4.3 (Eq. 
(20)), Schroder (2004) also studies the exposures of SRI funds to the small-cap index and a number of 
industry indices. For a portfolio minimizing the tracking-error risk, the average exposures to the small-cap 
index are 42% for German and Swiss SRI funds and 32% for the US funds. This finding confirms the 
small-cap bias for SRI funds, especially for the German and Swiss funds. More interestingly, the average 
exposure to non-cyclical service and consumer goods (such as food, beverage, healthcare and telecom) 
industries is  relatively  high  for  all  SRI  funds.  In  addition, German  and  Swiss  funds  also  have  high 
exposures to utilities (such as electricity, gas and water), whereas the US funds have high exposures to the 
financial and IT sectors. 
Some of Schroder’s results are consistent with those of Bauer et al. (2005): the European SRI funds 
are biased towards small stocks, while the US ones are biased towards large firms. The paper also tests 
the market timing ability of SRI fund managers by a conditional version of the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) 
model (Eq. (18)). The significance level of the timing coefficients suggests that only 5 out of the 46 funds 
demonstrate positive timing ability, while 7 fund managers time the market in the wrong direction (6 of 
whom are German and Swiss fund managers).   
There are two studies investigating the performance of SRI funds outside the US and Europe. Both 
studies measure the risk-adjusted returns by the conditional version of Carhart (1997) model. Bauer, Otten 
and  Tourani  Rad  (2006)  find  that,  for  the  period  of  1992-2003,  Australian  domestic  ethical  funds 
underperform  their  domestic  conventional  counterparts  by  –1.56%  per  year,  while  the  Australian 
international ethical funds outperform their conventional peers by 3.31% per year. However, none of 
these differences are statistically significant. For Canadian SRI funds, Bauer, Derwall and Otten (2006) 
show that the difference in average alphas is insignificant between the 8 SRI funds and 267 non-SRI 
funds  (-0.21%  vs.  –0.18%  per  month).  Hence,  their  findings  show  that  SRI  funds  do  not  out-  or 
underperform their conventional counterparts in Australia and Canada.  
Using a database consisting of 463 SRI mutual funds in the US, UK, Continental Europe and Asia-
Pacific, Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang (2007) study the risk and return characteristics of SRI mutual 
funds around the world. They hypothesize that investors may be willing to pay a premium for firms   31
meeting ethical/social standards. Consequently, such firms may be priced above their fundamental value, 
which results in underperformance by SRI funds. The authors also provide evidence in support of this 
hypothesis: SRI funds in many European and Asia-Pacific countries strongly underperform domestic 
benchmark portfolios. For instance, the risk-adjusted returns of the average SRI funds in Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden are on average less than –5% per annum. In addition, 
passive portfolios of ethical firms in Europe, i.e. companies included in the European ethical indices, 
significantly underperform the four benchmark factors by about 4.5% per annum. While the risk-adjusted 
returns of SRI funds in the UK and US are not statistically different from those of non-SRI funds, the 
holdings of these SRI funds may be very similar to those of conventional funds as 97% of the return 
variations of the UK and US SRI funds can be replicated by portfolios mimicking the four risk factors. 
Meanwhile, the results show that investors are willing to pay a premium for ethical firms for two reasons. 
First, they pay for the risk reduction by the ethical screening of firms. Second and more importantly, the 
behavioral bias of ‘aversion to unethical corporate behavior’ plays a role, as the premium paid is much 
higher than what is required to compensate risk. 
Furthermore, Renneboog et al. (2007) find that the total wealth invested in ethical funds in Europe 
(excluding the UK) and the Rest of World is reduced by about 6% per annum on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Part of ethical investors’ wealth is transferred to the fund managers who charge management fees of about 
1.5% per annum. On the existence of a ‘smart money’ effect in the SRI fund industry, the results are 
mixed: although ethical investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform their benchmarks 
ex ante, there is some fund-selection ability in identifying ethical funds that will perform poorly. In 
addition, the SRI constraints on the investment universe have a minimal impact on risk diversification, 
and there is little evidence of market timing ability by SRI fund managers around the world. Although 
SRI  portfolios  have  a  lower  Sharpe  ratio  and  are  less  (mean-variance)  efficient  than  conventional 
portfolios,  SRI  funds  now  hold  a  more  diversified  range  of  assets  in  their  portfolios  and  gradually 
converge  towards  conventional  funds.  Moreover,  the  screening  activities  of  SRI  funds  affect  funds’ 
expected returns: funds with more SRI screens have better returns even after controlling for well-known 
return  predictors.  An  interesting  result  is  that  employing  an  in-house  research  team  on  SRI  issues 
increases fund returns by 1.2% per annum, which supports the hypothesis that the screening process 
generates value-relevant non-public information. It also appears that the SRI screens have significant 
impact on funds’ risk factor loadings.
15 
  
                                                 
15 There is also another line of research that investigates the performance of SRI portfolios by constructing portfolios 
using firm-level information. For instance, Grossman and Sharpe (1986) compare the returns of a value-weighted 
South Africa-free portfolio to those of a comparable unscreened portfolio, and find that the difference in returns 
between these two portfolios is insignificant. Using KLD social data at the firm level, Guerard (1997) and Stone, 
Guerard, Gultekin, and Adams (2001) document that there are no statistically significant differences in returns 
between SRI screened portfolios and unscreened portfolios. Given that we focus on the performance of ethical 
mutual funds, we do not discuss these studies in detail.   32
To conclude, in this subsection we present empirical evidence of the performance of SRI mutual 
funds. For SRI funds in the US and UK, there is little evidence that the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds 
are different from those of conventional funds. However, SRI funds in Continental Europe and Asia-
Pacific  strongly  underperform  benchmark  portfolios.  Furthermore,  SRI  funds  have  specific  tilts  in 
industry compositions and risk exposures.  
 
5.5 Money-Flows of International SRI Funds 
 
As described in the Sections 5.2 to 5.4, most of the existing empirical studies on SRI funds focus on 
SRI fund performance. In spite of the fact that these SRI funds experienced a tremendous growth in most 
developed economies around the world, little is known about how investors select funds with explicit 
non-financial attributes. Investors in SRI funds may care more about social or ethical issues in their 
investment decisions than about fund performance.  
Some recent studies on the behavior of investors in conventional mutual funds show that both 
financial and non-financial fund attributes affect the choice of a particular mutual fund. Risk-adjusted as 
well  as  raw  past  performance  significantly  affect  the  money-flows  of  mutual  funds  (Chevalier  and 
Ellison, 1997; Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Goriaev, Nijman and Werker, 2005). 
While the top performing mutual funds attract most of the inflows, the weakly performing funds are 
hardly affected by outflows. This indicates that once money is invested, it tends to be rather sticky 
(Gruber, 1996). Furthermore, non-financial attributes, like mutual fund visibility (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) 
and mutual fund advertising (Jain and Wu, 1999), have a significant impact on the money-flows to mutual 
funds.  Berk  and  Green  (2004)  introduce  a  Bayesian  model  to  explain  why  investors  chase  past 
performance. According to this model, rational investors use past performance to update their information 
on managerial ability, which explains the strong money-flows to the best performing funds. 
The first study on the determinants of money-flows in the SRI fund industry was conducted by 
Bollen (2006), which concentrated on a univariate analysis of money-flows and past returns for US SRI 
funds. This study shows that, in the US, the volatility of money-flows is lower in SRI funds than in non-
SRI funds. Furthermore, the money-flows of SRI funds are less sensitive to lagged negative returns than 
flows in conventional funds, but more sensitive to lagged positive returns. 
Using a database consisting of 410 SRI mutual funds around the world, Renneboog, Ter Horst, and 
Zhang (2006) study the money-flows into and out of the SRI fund industry. They find that SRI investors 
chase  past  returns,  past  return  rankings,  and  persistence  in  past  performance,  as  do  investors  in 
conventional mutual funds. In particular, SRI funds that can be denoted as persistent winners receive 
about 30% more money inflows than persistent losers. Unless a fund persistently underperforms, SRI 
investors care more about past positive returns than about past negative returns. They also show that a 
higher screening intensity attracts more money-inflows than funds employing few screens. An interesting 
difference between SRI funds and conventional funds is the effect of fund fees on the money-flows. The   33
decision to invest in an SRI fund is less affected by management fees and load fees than the decision to 
invest in conventional funds. This may incentivize fund management companies to enter the SRI market 
as ethical investors seem to be willing to pay for the management of portfolios consistent with their social 
objectives.    
The variability in the money-flows is a serious concern of mutual fund managers because it can 
depress  fund  performance  due  to  the  costs  of  trading  the  shares  of  the  funds’  portfolios  which  are 
triggered by the net purchases or sales of shares in the funds. Renneboog et al. (2006) find that smaller, 
younger  or  riskier  SRI  funds  have  higher  money-flow  volatility,  partly  resulting  from  the  higher 
marketing efforts of these funds. Furthermore, the money-flow volatility is higher for SRI funds that 
experienced good recent performance, belong to a larger fund family or to a family with top performing 
funds. This may be due to the fact that myopic investors prefer funds belonging to a large family because 
switching between funds within the family can usually be done at low cost. An interesting result is that 
shareholder  activism  and  in-house  research  of  an  SRI  fund  significantly  lowers  the  monthly  flow 
volatility by 1.4% and 0.6%, respectively. Apparently, these two attributes attract more stable investors to 
the fund.   
The authors also examine whether or not SRI investors are able to select (invest their money in) 
funds that will generate high future performance. The results show that the SRI funds attracting most 
flows are not generating higher returns. This finding is reinforced by the analysis of the impact of past 
flows on persistence in (future) returns: they demonstrate that the probability that funds arise as persistent 
winners is reduced when these funds attract large past money inflows. They interpret this evidence by the 
emergence of decreasing returns of scale in fund investments. Thus, it seems that ethical money is not 
financially smart in the sense that the mutual fund reallocation decisions of SRI investors reduce their 
wealth. But there is one caveat to this conclusion: they find a positive relation between the use of SRI 
screens and future performance: the screening intensity of SRI funds improves returns. In particular, an 
SRI fund with 8 more screens is expected (all else equal) to have a higher abnormal return of 38 basis 
points per month (i.e. 4.6% annually) than SRI funds employing few screens. Apparently, funds with 
more SRI screens attracting higher money-inflows have better future returns than funds focusing on one 




This paper surveys the literature on socially responsible investments (SRI). Over the past decade, 
SRI has experienced an explosive growth around the world, and national governments in many western 
countries have taken regulatory initiatives regarding SRI. Particular to the SRI funds is that both financial 
goals and social objectives are pursued. 
The  literature  on  corporate  social  responsibility  (CSR)  shows  that,  in  general,  good  corporate 
governance, sound environmental standards, and good management towards stakeholder relations can   34
create  value  for  shareholders.  Participating  in  other  social  and  ethical  issues  is  likely  to  destroy 
shareholder value.  
Most existing research on SRI fund performance finds little evidence that the risk-adjusted returns 
of SRI funds in the US and UK are different from those of conventional funds. However, there is some 
evidence  that  SRI  funds  in  continental  Europe  and  Asia-Pacific  strongly  underperform  benchmark 
portfolios. Finally, the studies on the money-flows of SRI funds show that the volatility and money-flows 
is lower in SRI funds than in conventional funds, and that SRI investor’s decision to invest in an SRI fund 
is less affected by management fees and funds’ risk than conventional fund investors.   35
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Table 1: Asset under management of SRI funds and portfolios 
 
Panel A of this table presents the number (N) of retail SRI mutual funds and their assets under management (AUM, 
in billion US$), and Panel B reports the AUM of SRI screened portfolios (including the SRI AUM by pension funds 
and insurance companies). In Panel A, the European countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, and the UK, whereas in 
Panel B due to data availability, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Poland and Sweden are not included. Data in 
this table are collected from the following sources: US: SIF (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005); Europe: SiRi 







  US  Europe  Canada  Australia 
Year  N  AUM ($b)  N  AUM ($b)  N  AUM ($b)  N  AUM ($b) 
Panel A: SRI retail mutual funds 
1984      4           
1989      20           
1994      54           
1995  55  12             
1996              10  0.1 
1997  144  96             
1998                0.2 
1999  168  154  159  11         
2000          27  6.6     
2001  181  136  280  13      46  0.9 
2002          44  6.7     
2003  200  151  313  15      63  1.1 
2004            12.5     
2005  201  179  375  30         
Panel B:  SRI retail and institutional fund portfolios 
1995    639             
1997    1185             
1999    2159             
2000            33     
2001    2323            1.0 
2002            34     
2003    2164    288        1.8 
2004            55     
2005    2290            5.8   39
 
Table 2: SRI regulations 
 
This table summarizes the regulatory initiatives regarding SRI taken by national government in western countries.  
 
Country  SRI related regulations 
Australia   In a 2001 bill it is stated that all investment firms’ product disclosure statements should include a 
description of “the extent to which labor standards or environmental, social or ethical considerations 
are  taken  into  account.”  Since  2001,  all  listed  companies  on  the  Australian  Stock  Exchange  are 
required to make an annual social responsibility report. 
Belgium  In 2001, Belgium passed the ‘Vandebroucke’ law, which requires pension funds to report the degree to 
which their investments take into account social, ethical and environmental aspects. 
France  In May 2001, the legislation “New Economic Regulations” came into force requiring listed companies 
to publish social and environmental information in their annual reports.  
Since  February  2001  managers  of  the  Employee  Savings  Plans  are  required  to  consider  social, 
environmental or ethical considerations when buying and selling shares. 
Germany  Since 1991, the Renewable Energy Act gives a tax advantage to closed-end funds to invest in wind 
energy.  
Since  January  2002,  certified  private  pension  schemes  and  occupational  pension  schemes  ‘must 
inform the members in writing, whether and in what form ethical, social, or ecological aspects are 
taken into consideration when investing the paid-in contributions’. 
Italy  Since September 2004 pension funds are required to disclose non-financial factors (including social, 
environmental and ethical factors) influencing their investment decisions.   
Netherlands  In 1995, the Dutch Tax Office introduced a ‘Green Savings and Investment Plan’, which applies a tax 
deduction for green investments, such as wind and solar energy, and organic farming. 
Sweden  Since January 2002, Swedish national pension funds are obliged to incorporate environmental and 
ethical aspects in their investment policies. 
UK  In July 2000, the Amendment to 1995 Pensions Act came into force, requiring trustees of occupational 
pension funds in the UK to disclose in the Statement of Investment Principles “the extent (if at all) to 
which  social,  environmental  and  ethical  considerations  are  taken  into  account  in  the  selection, 
retention and realization of investments”.  
The Trustee Act 2000 came into force in February 2001. Charity trustees must ensure that investments 
are suitable to a charity’s stated aims, including applying ethical considerations to investments.  
In 2002, The Cabinet Office in the UK published the Review of Charity Law in 2002, which proposed 
that all charities with an annual income of over ￿ 1 m should report on the extent to which SEE issues 
are taken into account in their investment policy. The Home Office accepted theses recommendations 
in 2003.  
The  Association  of  British  Insurers  (ABI)  published  a  disclosure  guideline  in  2001,  asking listed 
companies to report on material SEE risks relevant to their business activities. 
US  Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which came into effect in July 2002, requires companies to 
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Table 3:  SRI screens 
 
This table summarizes the investment screens used by SRI mutual funds. In the last column, the ‘-‘ refers to a 
negative screen, whereas ‘+’ refers to a positive one. Data are compiled from Social Investment Forum (2003: 42) 
and the Natural Capital Institute (www.responsibleinvesting.org).  
 
Screens  Definitions  Type 
Tobacco  Avoid manufacturers of tobacco products  - 
Alcohol  Avoid  firms  that  produce,  market,  or  otherwise  promote  the  consumption  of 
alcoholic beverages 
- 
Gambling  Avoid casinos and suppliers of gambling equipment  - 
Defense /Weapons  Avoid firms producing weapons for domestic or foreign militaries, or firearms for 
personal use 
- 
Nuclear Power  Avoid manufacturers of nuclear reactors or related equipment and companies that 





Avoid firms with investments in government-controlled or private firms located in 
oppressive regimes such as Burma or China, or firms which mistreat the indigenous 





Avoid  publishers  of  pornographic  magazines;  production  studios  that  produce 
offensive video and audio tapes; companies that are major sponsors of graphic sex 




Avoid  providers  of  abortion;  manufacturers  of  abortion  drugs  and  birth  control 
products; insurance companies that pay for elective abortions (where not mandated 





Seek  firms  with  strong  union  relationships,  employee  empowerment,  and/or 
employee profit sharing. 




Environment  Seek  firms  with  proactive  involvement  in  recycling,  waste  reduction,  and 
environmental cleanup  






Seek companies demonstrating "best practices" related to board independence and 
elections,  auditor  independence,  executive  compensation,  expensing  of  options, 
voting rights and/or other governance issues.  





Business Practice  Seek companies committed to sustainability through investments in R&D, quality 




Seek  firms  pursuing  an  active  policy  related  to  the  employment  of  minorities, 
women,  gays/lesbians,  and/or  disabled  persons  who  ought  to  be  represented 
amongst senior management 
+ 
Human Rights  Seek firms promoting human rights standards  
Avoid firms which are complicit in human rights violations 
+ 
- 
Animal Testing  Seek firms promoting the  respectful treatment of animals  
Avoid firms with animal testing and firms producing hunting/trapping equipment or 
using animals in end products 
+ 
- 
Renewable Energy  Seek firms producing power derived form renewable energy sources  + 
Biotechnology  Seek  firms  that  support  sustainable  agriculture,  biodiversity,  local  farmers,  and 
industrial applications of biotechnology. 
Avoid firms involved in the promotion or development of genetic engineering for 






Seek  firms  with  proactive  investments  in  the  local  community  by  sponsoring 





The SRI funds that attempt to influence company actions through direct dialogue 
with management and/or voting at Annual General Meetings 
+ 
Non-married  Avoid insurance companies that give coverage to non-married couples  -   41
Healthcare/ 
Pharmaceuticals 






Avoid financial institutions that derive a significant portion of their income from 
interest earnings (on loans or fixed income securities). (Used by funds managed 
according to Islamic principles)  
- 
Pork Producers  Avoid  companies  that  derive  a  significant  portion  of  their  income  from  the 
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Table 4: Research methodologies of SRI studies 
 
This table summarizes the research methodologies of studies on socially responsible mutual funds.  
 









UK  1984-1990  15  CAPM   FT All Share Index  
or MSCI World 
Index 




UK  1984-1992  9  CAPM   FT All Share Index  
or a Small Cap Index 
No comparisons with 
non-SRI funds. 
 
Hamilton, Joe and 
Statman (1993) 
US  1981-1985 
1986-1990 
32  CAPM   Value-weighted 
NYSE Index 




& Briston (1995) 
UK  1986-1993  29  CAPM  FT All Shares Index  29 non-SRI funds, 
matched by fund size 
and age 
Gregory, Matatko 
and Luther (1997) 
UK  1986-1994  18  A two-factor 
model with 
two indices 
FT All Shares Index 
and Hoare Govett 
Small Cap index 
18 non-SRI funds, 
matched by fund size, 




Ahmed and Diltz 
(1999) 
US  1981-1997  49 
 
CAPM   Wilshire 5000 Equity 
Index (for equity 
funds) 
180 non-SRI funds, 
matched by investment 
objective, fund size and 
market beta. 
 
Statman (2000)  US  1990-1998  31   CAPM   S&P 500 
or DSI 400 Index 
62 non-SRI funds, 




















894 non-SRI funds, 
including dead funds  
Schroder (2004)  US, Germany  
Switzerland 


















MSCI World Index 
and  Salomon Smith 




S&P 500 and 
Wilshire Small Cap 
250 Index (for 
domestic US funds) 
 
 
No comparisons with 



















MSCI World Index.  40 non-SRI funds, 
matched by fund size, 
age, country, and 
investment universe. 
Bauer, Koedijk 
and Otten (2005) 
Germany, UK 
and US 














Schadt (1996)  
MSCI World Index 
or DJ Sustainability 
Global Index (for 
international funds); 
 
FT All Share Index 
or EIRIS ethical 
balance (for UK 
domestic funds) 
 
S&P 500 or DSI 400 
(for US domestic 
funds) 
 
4384 non-SRI funds 
(Germany 114, UK 
396, US 3874), 





Horst and Zhang 
(2006) 
17 countries 
around the world 






649 non-SRI funds in 
the UK 
Bauer, Otten and 
Tourani Rad, 
(2006) 











index or Westpac 
Monash Eco Index 
281 non-SRI funds 
including dead funds. 
Bauer, Derwall 
and Otten (2006) 











Index or Jantze 
Social Index 
267 non-SRI funds 
including dead funds. 
Barnett and 
Salomon (2006) 
US  1995, 1997, 
1999  (yearly) 
67  Average 
return 
No benchmark index.  No comparisons with 
non-SRI funds. 
Renneboog, Ter 
Horst and Zhang 
(2007) 
19 countries 
around the world 
















716 non-SRI funds in 
the UK and 12,624 non-
SRI funds in the US 
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Table 5: Empirical findings of SRI studies  
 
This table summarizes the empirical findings of studies on socially responsible mutual funds.  
 




UK  The Jensen’s alphas of ethical funds have mean of 0.03% per month (not significantly different from 0). 




UK  The Jensen’s alphas of ethical funds are measured against the FT All Share Index or against a Small-Cap 
Index. R-squared is higher in the first regression than the second one, which implies that the SRI portfolio is 






US  For 17 SRI funds established before 1985, the average alpha is –0.06% per month, which is higher than the 
average monthly alpha (–0.14%) of 170 non-SRI funds (the difference is not significant). Meanwhile for the 
15 SRI funds with shorter history, i.e. established after 1985, the average alpha is –0.28% per month, which 





UK  The monthly alphas of ethical funds range from -0.28% to 1.21%, while 22 out of the 29 alphas are positive. 
Alphas of non-ethical funds, 23 of which being positive, range from -0.41% to 1.56% per month (difference 





UK  The alphas of ethical funds range from –0.71% to 0.24% per month (almost all are not significant). In a 
regression with both ethical and non-ethical funds, the ethical fund dummy does not have a significant 
impact on fund performance after controlling for fund age, size, and the market risk. Most of the ethical 





US  The average Jensen’s alpha of 29 SRI equity funds is –0.49% per annum, whereas that of 20 non-SRI equity 
funds is 2.78%. The difference is not significant. SRI funds using positive screens outperform the SRI funds 
that do not (the average monthly alphas are –0.11% and –0.81%, respectively, and the difference between 
them is statistically significant). 
 
Statman (2000)  US  The average monthly alpha is –0.42% for SRI funds and –0.62% for non-SRI funds; the difference is not 
significant (t-statistics = 1.84). The DSI 400 index has a higher Sharpe ratio than the S&P 500 index (0.97 
vs. 0.92).  
 
Schroder (2004)  Germany,  
Switzerlan
d, and US  
The monthly alphas range from –2.06% to 0.87%. 38 out of the 46 alphas are negative; only 4 of them are 
significant at 0.05 level. SRI funds do not significantly underperform the benchmark portfolio consisting of 
both  large  stocks  and  small  stocks.  Note  that  11  out  of  the  16  German  and  Swiss  funds  have  higher 
exposures to the small-cap index than to the large-cap index. Only 5 out of the 46 funds have positive 





US  The average expense ratio of SRI funds is higher than that of non-SRI funds (1.33% vs. 1.10%), whereas 
the average annual turnover of SRI funds is much lower than that of non-SRI funds (81.5% vs. 175.4%). 
The SRI funds have much smaller size than non-SRI funds: the average asset under management (across 
time and across funds) is $149 million and $257 million respectively.  
 
The monthly alpha of the SRI portfolio is higher than that of the non-SRI portfolio (0.21% vs. 0.08%), but 
the difference is insignificant. Meanwhile, the risk exposure of the SRI portfolio to the size factor (SMB 
factor) is higher than that of the non-SRI portfolio (0.20 vs. 0.16). .  
 
To a market index investor the financial cost of the SRI constraint is 5 basis points per month. The SRI 
constraint imposes large costs, more than 1.5% per month, on investors whose beliefs allow selection skill. 
Moreover, further restricting the SRI universe to the funds that screen out “sin” stocks (e.g. alcohol, tobacco 





 Europe  The average Jensen’s alphas of  SRI  and non-SRI funds are 0.20% and 0.12%  per month, respectively 
(difference is statistically insignificant). In addition, the market timing coefficients are similar for the two 
types of funds (-0.29 vs. –0.28), and each of them is significant at the 0.05 level. However, the signs of the 
timing coefficients are negative, which implies that both SRI and non-SRI fund managers time the market 








Ethical funds have smaller size and higher expense ratio than conventional funds. The average monthly 
alphas of SRI funds are 0.29%, 0.09% and –0.05% for Germany, UK domestic and US domestic funds, 
respectively. The US domestic ethical funds significantly underperform conventional domestic funds, while 
for US international funds the difference in returns between ethical and conventional funds is insignificant. 
The UK ethical funds, both domestic and international funds, significantly outperform conventional funds. 
The difference in average alphas between German SRI and non-SRI funds is insignificant. Overall, there is 
little evidence of significant differences in risk-adjusted returns between SRI and non-SRI funds. 
 
For  German  and  US  ethical  funds:  after  significant  underperformance  in  the  early  1990s,  they  match 
conventional fund performance over 1998-2001. Older ethical funds (launched before 1998) outperform 
younger ethical funds. German and UK ethical funds are heavily exposed to small-cap stocks while US 







Ethical money chases past returns. In contrast to conventional funds’ investors, SRI investors care less 
about the funds’ risks and fees. Funds characterized by shareholder activism and by in-house SRI research 
attract more stable investors. Membership of a large SRI fund family creates higher flow volatility due to 
the lower fees to reallocate money within the fund family. SRI funds receiving most of the money-inflows 
perform worse in the future, which is consistent with theories of decreasing returns to scale in the mutual 
fund industry. Finally, funds employing a higher number of SRI screens to model their investment universe 





Australia  Domestic ethical funds underperform domestic conventional funds by –1.56% per year. International ethical 





Canada  The difference in average alphas is insignificant between the SRI funds and non-SRI funds (-0.21% vs. –




US  When the number of social screens used by an SRI fund increases, the fund’s annual return declines at first, 







Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in many European and Asia-Pacific countries 
strongly underperform domestic benchmark portfolios. For instance, the risk-adjusted returns of the average 
SRI funds in Belgium, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden are on average less than –
5% per annum. Ethics is a distinct factor that determines the expected equity returns, consistent with ethical 
firms being less risky. SRI investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform in the future, 
whereas they show some fund-selection ability in identifying ethical funds that will perform poorly in the 
future. SRI funds are gradually converging to conventional funds by holding a more diversified range of 
assets in their portfolios. Finally, the screening activities of SRI funds have a significant impact on funds’ 
risk-adjusted returns and loadings on risk factors. 
 
 